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INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that in the past couple of decades, federal
antitrust,' commodity oversight, 2 and consumer protection 3 authorities have failed to prevent widespread abuse of American energy consumers. Based on blind faith in markets and an overzealous deregulation ideology, rather than an empirical assessment of the

1 By agreement between the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), oil industry mergers are reviewed by the FTC. Wikipedia - Federal Trade Commission, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_
TradeCommission (last visited May 5, 2007).
2 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) oversees commodity
trading and traders. Wikipedia - Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cftc (last visited May 5, 2007). The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has authority over the corporate form of traders, particularly hedge funds. Wikipedia - The Securities and Exchange Commission,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEC (last visited May 5, 2007).
3 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviews some energy
sector mergers (in the electricity and natural gas sectors) and oversees interstate
wholesale markets. The U.S. Department of Energy gathers information and reports on all energy sectors. As an executive branch agency, it has administrative
authority over some aspects of the energy sector, like the strategic petroleum reserve.
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fundamentals of energy markets, they allowed energy markets to become too concentrated and failed to exercise responsible oversight of
energy trading practices and wholesale markets.
Market forces in the energy sector are extraordinarily weak
because energy markets exhibit extremely low elasticities of supply
and demand, high barriers to entry and other structural characteristics
that make them inflexible. These market fundamentals render both
physical energy markets, where energy commodities are produced,
transported and consumed, and financial commodity markets, where
energy contracts and futures are traded, extremely vulnerable to the
exercise of market power and other abusive practices.4 Lax enforcement in merger analysis and market oversight has cost consumers
hundreds of billions of dollars.
The paper is divided into four parts. Part I begins with a discussion of the analytical framework taken from traditional market
power and merger analysis, which emphasizes the importance of
market fundamentals. It then applies that framework to describe the
weak market forces in the energy sector. Part II presents a case study
of lax merger review in the petroleum industry. Part III presents a
case study of lax commodity trading oversight focusing on the natural
gas sector. Part IV presents a case study of the inadequate provision
of structural safeguards in the deregulation of the electricity sector.
Singling out a different energy sector to highlight a different
aspect of the broader failure of consumer protection should not be
taken to mean that the problems identified did not occur in all three
sectors. Lax merger review affected both oil and natural gas. Poorly
designed deregulation affected natural gas and electricity. Commodity market manipulation and abuse affected all three energy markets.
Moreover, these three failures of public policy interacted to expose
American consumers to a brutal spiral of rising and volatile energy
prices in all three sectors (see Exhibit I-1).

Mark Cooper, Citizens Research, Industrial Organization and Market Performance in the Transportation and Communications Industries (1985), used the
term "vulnerable" to describe several of the sectors discussed in this paper.
4
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Exhibit I-I: Physical, Financial and Regulatory Factors in the
Explosive Spiral of Energy Prices
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As in all policy debates, the industry has a different account.
Their story is that prices just reflect the normal working of the market
- "its just supply and demand." On one level this article agrees supply and demand elasticities are so low that these markets are vulnerable and prone to volatility. It is policymakers who have let the
public down by failing to adopt policies that protect consumers from
exploitation in these markets where market forces are weak and
prone to market failure. On another level, this paper disagrees with
the "its just supply and demand" claim. In concentrated, inflexible
markets, supply becomes a strategic variable that entities with market
power manipulate to increase profits over the long term and institutional structures make markets more or less vulnerable, more or less
responsive to "external" events. Neither supply nor the reactions to
tight markets are givens. Again, public policy matters. While the
back and forth debate is important and interesting, this paper presents
the case from the consumer point of view.

I. Fundamentals of MARKET POWER Analysis
A. Antitrust Analysis
In a seminal 1981 Harvard Law Review article, 5 William
Landes and Richard Posner, two of the leading Chicago School law
and economics practitioners, 6 asked "what degree of market power
should be actionable?" They responded: "the answer in any particular
case depends on the interaction of two factors: the size of7 the market
(total volume of sales) and the antitrust violation alleged.",
In a section entitled Market Share Alone is Misleading, they
argued that antitrust authorities should take market fundamentals into
account. In assessing the potential impact of market power, "the
proper measure will attempt to capture the influence of market demand and supply elasticity on market power." 8 Their intention was
to convince antitrust authorities to ease up on enforcement, but the
proposition could work in both directions. Markets that have low
I William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Anti-trust Cases,
94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981).
6 Lawrence Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook 27 (Hornbook Series, West Group, 2000), refer to the article as
influential and note the debate it caused. They are generally critical of the Chicago
School approach.
7 Landes and Posner, supra note 5, at 953.
8

1d. at 947.
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elasticities or high total dollar stakes could certainly demand more
scrutiny, not less. Landes and Posner acknowledged this in some respects.
In all of the examples, the effect of adopting the approach
advocated in this paper was to reduce or eliminate the inference of market power drawn from market share data.
This will probably be the result in most cases of using our
approach, simply because exclusive and uncritical focus on
market share data tends to produce an exaggerated impression of market power. In some cases, however, our approach will result in correcting an9 underestimation of market power based on market share.
This paper argues the latter is the case in the energy sector.
Landes and Posner focus on the most common indicator of
market power, the Lerner index, 10 which measures the extent to
which prices are marked up over costs. "We point out that the Lerner
index provides a precise economic definition of market power, and
we demonstrate the functional relationship between market power on
the one hand and market share, market elasticity of demand, and supply elasticity of fringe competitors on the other."' 1 The Lerner Index
is frequently expressed as the inverse of the elasticity of demand, but
Landes and Posner rendered it in a somewhat different formulation.
L

(P - C)
P

=

1
-

Si
-

edm+ ej(1 - Si)

where:
Sd =

edm

the market share of the dominant firm
elasticity of demand in the market

9Id. at 950.

10F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 70-71 (Houghton Mifflin 1990) ("[T]he Lerner Index[is] defined as: "[L]
= (Price - Marginal Cost)/ Price... Its merit is that it directly reflects the allocatively
inefficient departure of price from marginal cost associated with monopoly. Under
pure competition, [L]=0. The more a firm's pricing departs from the competitive
norm, the higher is the associated Lemer Index value. A related performanceoriented approach focuses on some measure of the net profits realized by firms or
industries.").
1"Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 938.
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esj = elasticity of supply of the competitive fringe
si = market share of the fringe.
In other words, this formula says that the markup of price
over cost will be directly related to the market share of the dominant
firm and inversely related to the ability of consumers to reduce consumption (the elasticity of demand) and the ability of other firms (the
competitive fringe) to increase output (the elasticity of supply).
Because Landes and Posner were arguing against a simplistic
and mechanical focus on market share in market power analysis,
they noted that their own formula should not be applied mechanically. They incorporated a number of traditional concerns by arguing
that each of the terms in the equation should be defined to reflect
other market characteristics in specific applications. 12 Thus excess
capacity, rather than simple market shares, barriers to entry, and long
distance transport (such as a broad market definition), among other
factors, should inform the definition of the competitive fringe. 13 On
the demand side, substitutability (product definition) should be carefully examined.14
A series of responses to the Landes and Posner article was
published in the HarvardLaw Review the following year. These responses suggested limitations and improvements to the Landes and
Posner approach. One of the main criticisms was that the authors
were analyzing only the dominant firm market share in the numerator, when oligopolies are a more typical situation.' 5 An improvement
was suggested in which the Lemer index was related to a measure of
the overall market concentration - the Herfindahl Concentration Index (HCI). The HCI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of
all the producers in the market. Importantly, the Lemer Index is
equal to the HCI divided by the elasticity of demand.
L=

HCI = S. 2
Ed

12

Id.

Ed

at 949.

13 id.
14 id.

15

Richard Schmalensee, Anothe, Look At Market Power, 95 Harv. L. Rev.

1789, 1797 (1982); Janusz A. Ordover, Alan 0. Sykes & Robert D. Willig, Herfindahl Concentration, Rivalry, and Mergers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1863-1867 (1982).
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The HCI uses the market shares of all participants in the numerator of the fraction since oligopolists may not "compete."' 6
Another suggested improvement for the formula was to adjust
it to take into account the key factor of strategic interactions and historic behavior. A term can be included which adjusts for the special
impact of the market shares of other firms 17
L =

(P -C)
P

HCI(I+k)
Ed

where k = the effect of strategic interaction
If the likelihood of strategic interaction will reinforce the efforts of the dominant firm to raise prices, then k can be set positive.
If a uniquely vigorous competitive response is likely, then k can be
set negative. When k equals zero, there is no strategic interaction effect. Estimating the value of k is a subjective process, but it does add
an important element to relating market structure to market performance through conduct.
B. Merger Analysis
At roughly the same time as the responses to the Landes and
Posner article appeared, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued updated Merger Guidelines
to frame the approach to merger analysis. The Merger Guidelines
describe their concern with market power as follows:
Market power to a seller is the ability profitably to maintain
prices above competitive levels for a significant period of
time. In some circumstances, a sole seller (a "monopolist")
of a product with no good substitutes can maintain a selling
price that is above the level that would prevail if the market
were competitive. Similarly, in some circumstances, where
only a few firms account for most of the sales of a product,
those firms can exercise market power, perhaps even approximating the performance of a monopolist, by either explicitly or implicitly coordinating their actions. Circum16 Other

scholars argue that the formulation assumes Comout oligopoly behavior. W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Economics of
Regulation and Antitrust 149 (MIT Press 2000).
17 Ordover, Sykes and Willig, supra note 15, at 1860-62.
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stances also may permit a single firm, not a monopolist, to
exercise market power through unilateral or noncoordinated conduct - conduct the success of which does
not rely on the concurrence of other firms in the market or
on coordinated responses by those firms. In any case, the
result of the exercise of market power is a transfer of
wealth from buyers to sellers or a misallocation of resources.

Sellers with market power also may lessen competition on
such as product quality, serdimensions other than
18 price,
vice, or innovation.
The Merger Guidelines recognize that market power can be
exercised with coordinated, or parallel activities and even unilateral
actions in situations where there are small numbers of market players. 19 The area of non-collusive, oligopoly behavior has received a
great deal of attention. A variety of models have been developed
which demonstrate that small numbers of market participants interacting in the market, especially on a repeated basis, can learn to sigthat capnal, anticipate, and parallel one another to achieve outcomes
20
ture a substantial share of the potential monopoly profits.
U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
§ 0.1 (1997) [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. A similar concern applies
to monopsony power:
18

Market power also encompasses the ability of a single buyer (a "monopsonist"), a coordinating group of buyers, or a single buyer, not a monopsonist, to depress the price paid for a product to a level that is below the competitive price and
thereby depress output. The exercise of market power by buyers ("monopsony
power") has adverse effects comparable to those associated with the exercise of
market power by sellers. In order to assess potential monopsony concerns, the
Agency will apply an analytical framework analogous to the framework of these
Guidelines.
19Sullivan and Grimes, supra note 6, at 530..
The rule of thumb reflected in all iterations of the Merger Guidelines is that the
more concentrated an industry, the more likely is oligopolistic behavior by that industry.... Still, the inference that higher concentration increases the risks of oligopolistic conduct seems well grounded. As the number of industry participants
becomes smaller, the task of coordinating industry behavior becomes easier. For
example, a ten-firm industry is more likely to require some sort of coordination to
maintain prices at an oligopoly level, whereas the three-firm industry might more
easily maintain prices through parallel behavior without express coordination.
20 John B. Taylor, Economics 303-308 (Houghton Mifflin 2001); W. Kip Viscusi,, John M. Vernon & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Economics of Regulation and
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The identification of when a small number of firms can exercise this power is not a precise science. Nevertheless, when the number of significant firms falls into the single digits there is cause for
concern. "Up to perhaps six firms one has oligopoly, and with fifty or
more firms of roughly similar size one has competition; however, for
sizes in between it may be difficult to say. The
answer is not a matter
21
matter.",
empirical
an
rather
but
of principle,
In order to assess the potential for the exercise of market
power resulting from a merger, the DOJ/FTC analyze the level of
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI). This measure takes the market share of each firm, squares it,
sums the result, and multiplies by 10,000 to clear the decimal. 22 The
HHI is the HCI with the fraction cleared.
Not only can the HHI be directly related to the Lerner Index,
as noted above, it also has an easy interpretation. 23 A market that is
made up of 10 equal-sized firms will have an HHI of 1000. Each
firm has a 10 percent market share.24 In such a market, the top four
firm concentration ratio (CR4), which is also frequently used to describe market concentration, would be 40 percent.
The DOJ considers a market with fewer than the equivalent of 10 equal-sized firms
to be concentrated.
The DOJ considers an HHI of 1800 as the point at which a
market is highly concentrated. To appreciate this level of concentration, note that a market with five equal sized firms would have an
HHI of 2000 and be considered highly concentrated. A market with
six equal sized firms would have an HHI of 1667, just below the
highly concentrated level. Thus the highly concentrated threshold
falls between the equivalent of five and six equal sized firms, or the
equivalent of 5.5 equal sized firms. The four firm concentration ratio
would be 72 percent, assuming equal-sized firms. Markets with an
Antitrust 97-142 (MIT Press 2000); Jean Fudenberg,& Jean Tirole, Noncooperative

Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview in Handbook of Industrial Organization (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds.,
North-Holland 1989).
21 James Friedman, Oligopoly Theory 8-9 (Cambridge University Press 1983).
22

William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization 389 (Pren-

tice Hall 1985).
23 The HHI can be converted to equal-sized equivalents as follows:
Equal-sized voice equivalents = (1/HHI)* 10,000.
24 Squaring the share yields 100 points for each firm, multiplied by 10 firms
(lox lox 10).
25 Shepherd, supra note 22, at 388.
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HHI between 1000 and 1800 are considered moderately concentrated.
These thresholds are consistent with longstanding economic
analysis, which had been framed in terms of the market share of the
top four firms. As William Shepherd put it:
Tight Oligopoly: The leading four firms combined have 60100 percent of the market; collusion among them is relatively easy.
Loose Oligopoly: The leading four firms combined have 40
percent or less of the market- collusion among them to fix
prices is virtually impossible.
The Merger Guidelines identify the types of mergers that will
raise competitive concerns as follows:
Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100
points in moderately concentrated markets post-merger potentially raise significant competitive concerns depending
on the factors set forth in Sections 2-5 of the Guidelines....
Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 50
points in highly concentrated markets post-merger potentially raise significant competitive concerns, depending on
the factors set forth in Sections 2-5 of the Guidelines.
Where the post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, it will be presumed that mergers producing an increase in the HHI of
more than 100 points are likely2 7to create or enhance market
power or facilitate its exercise.
The magnitude of the price increase that is of concern is identified as a "small but significant and nontransitory increase in price
(SSNIP). ' 2 8
The Merger Guidelines suggest asking the question using a
5% SSNIP - that is asking whether a nontransitory price increase of
5% or more would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist.
Nonetheless, the Merger Guidelines explicitly recognize that "the nature of the industry" may lead enforcement agencies to use some
26

Id. at 4.

27

Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 18, § 1.51 (b)-(c).

28

Federal Trade Commission, The Petroleum Industry: Mergers, Structural

Change, and Antitrust Enforcement 21 (2004) [Hereinafter FTC Report].
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other, more appropriate price standard. The FTC staff frequently has
increase in defining the relevant
used a one-cent-per-gallon price
29
market for petroleum mergers.
C. Quantifying the Importance of Market Fundamentals
Landes and Posner provided a simple analytical exercise to
make their point on the importance of elasticities of supply and demand, calculating the market share necessary to achieve a 20 percent
mark-up of price over cost. I focus on 5 and 10 percent increases,
since the FTC and the DOJ concern themselves with price increases
as low as 5 percent, 30 particularly in an industry where the dollar
value of output is very large, as is true with petroleum products. As
shown in Exhibit 1-2, in the face of low elasticities of supply and demand, firms can gain market power with relatively small market
shares and at low levels of concentration. Under the assumptions of
low elasticities of supply and demand, market shares around 10 percent yield market power to raise price significantly.
Exhibit 1-2: Landes and Posner Formula Showing Sensitivity of
Market Power to Elasticities
(Percent Mark-up of Price Over Cost)
Elasticity of
Supply

Lead firm

2.5 0-5

High 3
Low I

X
X
X

Low I

30

to charge prices

yHigh Low 10%/

of
Hih3
a

29

Mark up at DOJ/FTC Theshold
_ IHI- 1800
HHI =1000
Lead Firm

mShare

above margn cost of.Share

-

East

Market Share
Necessary for fim

X

5%

41%

10% 31%

18%

12

7

4

9

9

5

K4
11

6

13
18

23 1

16

33

50

26

36
27

19
14

3

14

7

17

Id. at 22.
Wikipedia -

SSNIP, located at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSNIPTest

(last visited May 5, 2007).
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Source: Elasticity examples and formula from William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 958 (1981).
Also shown in Exhibit 1-2 are the results of an exercise that
applies the Landes and Posner formula to the DOJ/FTC thresholds,
under two sets of assumptions. First, we assume equal size firms.
This is the lower bound of the mark-up under the Landes and Posner
approach. We also calculate the mark-up assuming the largest firm
that would still keep the HHI below the threshold. If a five percent
increase in the mark-up is a concern, then the thresholds seem correct. Even with high elasticities as defined, the mark-up in highly
concentrated markets is a source of concern. When either supply or
demand elasticity is low, moderately concentrated markets are a
source of concern. Moreover, as we move through the moderately
concentrated range under these elasticities the mark-up approaches
the level that triggers concern. As the market structure becomes
dominated by a single firm, the concern about market power approaches or exceeds the threshold in all cases. Finally, as one firm
has a larger role, even in the moderately concentrated range, concern
about the exercise of market power increases.
In the alternative, as shown in Exhibit 1-3, the HHI necessary
to achieve a specified mark-up of price over cost at various market
elasticities of demand can be calculated. Again we use 5% and 10%
mark-ups. At low levels of elasticity (1-2), a 5 percent mark-up can
be achieved at relatively low levels of concentration. At moderate
levels of elasticity (2-3), the thresholds appear well-chosen.
Exhibit 1-3: HHI Necessary to Achieve a Lerner Index Mark-up
Price Increase
Elasticity of Market Demand
1
2
3
4
5

10%

5%

1000
2000
3000
4000
5000

500
1000
1500
2000
2500

328

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

[Vol. 19:4

D. Commodity Price Manipulation and Influence
The analysis of commodity price manipulation is not as formalized as the antitrust/merger analysis, but the same principles apply. The weaker the key market forces, the more vulnerable the
commodity is to price manipulation. The same basic factors come
into play here.
The extent of market power depends on supply and demand
conditions, seasonal factors, and transport costs. For commodity
markets, however, transportation and storage take on special importance. These transport cost-related frictions are likely to be important
in many markets,
including grains, non-precious metals and petroleum products. All else equal, the lower the storage costs for a commodity, the more elastic its demand.
Economic frictions (including transportation, storage, and
search costs) which impede the transfer of the underlying
commodity among different parties separated in space or
time can create the conditions that the large trader can exploit in order to cause a supracompetitive price...
Although the formal analysis examines transportation costs
as the source of friction, the consumption distortion results
suggest that any friction that makes it costly to return a
commodity to its original owners (such as storage costs or
search costs) may facilitate manipulation.
Transportation costs are an example of an economic friction that isolates geographically dispersed consumers. The
results therefore suggest that any form of transaction costs
that impedes the transfer of a commodity among consumers
can make manipulation possible. 31
The characteristics of energy commodities are fundamentally
different from simple financial commodities. The key elements are
the supply-side difficulties of production, transportation and storage,
31 Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Economics, Law and Public Policy of Market
Power Manipulation 9-10, 24, 59 (Kluwer 1996). See also Jeffrey Williams &

Brian Wright, Storage and Commodity Markets (Cambridge University Press

1991); Angus Deaton and Guy Laroque, On the Behavior of Commodity Prices, 59
Rev. of Econ. Stud. 1-23 (1992).
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and the demand-side challenges of providing for a continuous flow of
energy to meet inflexible demand, which is subject to seasonal consumption patterns.
[T]he deliverables in money markets consist of a "piece of
paper" or its electronic equivalent, which are easily stored
and transferred and are insensitive to wedther conditions.
Energy markets paint a more complicated picture. Energies
respond to the dynamic interplay between producing and
using; transferring and storing; buying and selling - and ultimately "burning" actual physical products. Issues of storage, transport, weather and technological advances play a
major role here.
In energy markets, the supply side concerns not only the
storage and transfer of the actual commodity, but also how
to get the actual commodity out of the ground. The end
user truly consumes the asset. Residential users need energy for heating in the winter and cooling in the summer,
and industrial users' own products continually depend on
energy to keep the plants running and to avoid the high cost
of stopping and restarting them. Each of these energy participants - be they producers or end users - deals with a

different set of fundamental drivers, which in turn affect the
behavior of energy markets...
What makes energies so different is the excessive number
of fundamental price32 drivers, which cause extremely com-

plex price behavior.

Manipulation of markets narrowly defined as "the exercise of
monopoly or monopsony power in a futures market (or more generally a derivative securities market) and/or the cash market for the underlying commodity near the expiration data of the future (derivative
security)

33

and studies of classic attempts to comer or squeeze mar-

kets receive a great deal of attention in the commodity market literature. However, this type of behavior is only a small part of the story.
Other behaviors like insider trading, or blatant fraud, are recognized
32

Dragana Pilipovic, Energy Risk: Valuing and Managing Energy Derivates 3

(McGraw-Hill 1998).
33 Pirrong, supra note 31, at 6. Monopsony is a situation where there is a single
or few buyers of a good or service, which enables the buyers to control (lower) the
price paid for the good or service.
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by the public, but there are a host of more technical behaviors that
others see as problematic.
The list is large indeed: trading ahead of customers (frontrunning), repeated purchases at rising prices (bulling the
market), repeated sales at falling prices (bearing the market), buying or selling to activate resting limit orders so as
to touch-off technical rallies or declines (gunning the
stops), rigged trading at the open or close, wash sales, and
spreading of rumors...
It is essential to distinguish the exercise of market power
near expiration of a futures
contract from the effect of large
34
trades that move prices.
Whether or not all of these behaviors to "move prices" violate
some statute, they can have an effect on prices and pricing behaviors.
Consumers and policymakers should care about both manipulation
and behaviors that "move prices." In fact, virtually everything on this
list of horribles has been alleged to have occurred in energy markets
in the past decade, backed up with consent decrees, fines and court
cases. The important point, here, however, is not that these behaviors
take place, but that the structural conditions that make them possible
are very deeply engrained in energy markets and have a broad impact
on prices.
E. Energy Market Fundamentals
1. Overview
What emerges from this discussion is a framework for analysis that is traditionally known as the structure, conduct, performance
paradigm (SCP). 35 In SCP analysis the central concern is with market
performance, since that is the outcome that affects consumers most
directly (see Exhibit 1-4). The highlighted items will be discussed in
the analysis of the energy sector in this paper.

34 Id.

35 Scherer and Ross, supra note 10, at 4-6; Shepherd, supra note 22, at 5.
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Exhibit 1-4: The Structure, Conduct, Performance Paradigm
(Highlighted items are Discussed in this Analysis)
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SOURCE: F. M. Scherer & David Ross, IndustrialMarket Structure
and Economic Performance5 (Houghton Mifflin 1990).
The concept of performance is multidimensional. The measures of performance to which we traditionally look are pricing, as
above, as well as quality and profits. Pricing and profits address both
efficiency and fairness. They are the most direct measure of how society's wealth is being allocated and distributed. The performance of
industries is determined by a number of factors, most directly the
conduct of market participants. Do they compete? What legal tactics
do they employ? How do they advertise and price their products?
Conduct is affected and circumscribed by market structure. Market
structure includes an analysis of the number and size of the firms in
the industry, their cost characteristics and barriers to entry. Basic
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conditions of supply and demand also deeply affect market structure.
Public policy is also recognized as playing a key role in this paradigm. Antitrust and regulation are the two key policy areas discussed
in this paper, while price controls will be mentioned in the discussion
of electricity.
The multidimensional view of markets offered by this framework fits the fundamental economic traits of energy production and
consumption well. Energy markets are highly complex. Their volatility poses particular challenges for policy and economic analysis.
The economic characteristics of energy commodities can be readily
placed in the analytical framework as the following schematic shows
(see Exhibit 1-5).
Exhibit 1-5: Key Characteristics Increasing the Likelihood of the
Market Power in the Energy Sector
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Inflexibility of demand and its sensitivity to weather renders
the market volatile and vulnerable to abuse. The elasticity of market
demand is very low in the short-term and low in the long-term. Demand shows strong seasonality patterns, which lowers the elasticity at
key moments. The demand side cannot be counted on to discipline
abusive pricing behavior. Institutional and economic barriers make it
difficult for consumers to self-supply or bargain effectively for supplies.
The elasticity of supply is low. Short-term supply responses
are constrained by the difficulty of storing energy. Significant addi-
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tions to supply require substantial lead times, making the supply-side
"lumpy" and slow. Provision for reserves is uncertain in a competitive market because the provision of reserves is unattractive to business interests, unless peak prices are extremely high. Consequently,
markets may be chronically tight or subject to extreme price volatility.
Since production assets are sunk and demand is immobile, the
transportation system stands at the intersection of many of the energy
industry problems. The transport components of the industry - pipelines for oil and gas, transmission and distribution in electricity - are
presently natural monopolies and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.Because of the severe conditions that typify energy
markets, concentration must be considered in very narrow geographic
and product terms. Isolated, concentrated local markets enable local
suppliers to drive prices up. In these tight markets, collusion is not
necessary to drive prices up; parallel actions by a small number of
suppliers are sufficient. Even though peaks are short in duration,
they can impose huge price distortions because of the large quantities
consumed and extremely low elastiticies.
2. Demand Is Inelastic
The continuous flow of large quantities of product to meet
highly seasonal demand is the central characteristic of the demand
side of the market. Examining price and income elasticities leads to
the conclusion that energy is a necessity of daily life. The price elasticity is quite
low, while the income elasticity is higher, but still rela36
low.
tively
Energy consumption is determined by the physical and economic structure of daily life. Demand is generally predictable in a
seasonal pattern.
People need to drive on a daily basis because of the way our
communities are built and our transportation systems designed.
Stores are far from homes. Homes are far from work. Social and after-school activities are dispersed. In most communities, mass transit
is scarce and inconvenient. We own more cars and drive more miles
on a household basis over time. These trends and patterns have be36

See generally Lester Taylor, Telecommunications Demand: A Survey and

Critique 82 (Ballinger 1980). Taylor argues that a necessity is characterized by a
low price elasticity of demand and a moderate income elasticity of demand. In the
face of rising prices, the low price elasticity indicates that substitution away from
the commodity is difficult and the moderate income elasticity indicates that reduced
demand imposes welfare losses, as households are forced to devote a larger share of
their income to the commodity.
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come stronger and more deeply entrenched as our society has become
wealthier and the tendency for two-earner households has grown.
For the past three decades there has been an almost perfect, one-toone correspondence between economic growth and the growth of total miles driven.
People consume natural gas for heating primarily and, increasingly, for electricity. The amount they consume is dictated in
large part by the kinds of buildings in which they live and work and
the energy efficiency of the appliances they use. Natural gas has become the fuel of choice for many residential uses. It has been the favorite of the electricity industry for about a decade.
The central role that electricity plays in modem life is obvious. There are simply no substitutes for lighting and refrigeration, or
to power the appliances that fill twenty-first century homes in the developed world.
The demand elasticity for gasoline has been studied hundreds
of times in the U.S. and abroad. The best estimate of short-term elasticity, usually measured by demand response in a period of about a
year, is -.2.
In other words, when prices increase by 10 percent,
demand declines by only 2 percent. The best estimate of the longterm elasticity is about -.4.38 While fewer estimates of the elasticit
of demand for natural gas have been made, the results are similar.
Short-term elasticities are in the range of -.3; long-term elasticities
are in the range of -.6. An occasional estimate of long-term elasticity
is in the neighborhood of -1.0. The best evidence from electricity
markets is that the short-run elasticity of demand is in the range of 0
See Molly Espey, Gasoline Demand Revisited: An International MetaAnalysis of Elasticities, 20 Energy Econ. 273 (1998) (identifying 363 estimates of
37

short-term elasticity. The median is - .23 for the short term and - .43 for the long
term); Hilke A. Kayser, Gasoline Demand and Car Choice: Estimating Gasoline
Demand Using Household Information, 22 Energy Econ. 341 (2000) (estimating
the short-term elasticity in the U.S. at -.23); Steven L. Puller & Loma A. Greening,
Household Adjustment to Gasoline Price Change: An Analysis Using 9 Years of
US Survey Data, 21 Energy Econ. 45 (1999) (finding a one-year price elasticity of.34, but modeling a more complex structure of responses within shorter periods.
They find a larger elasticity of miles traveled in the first quarter after a price shock
(-.69 to -.76), but that demand "snaps back." The larger reduction in miles driven
is still "inelastic." Moreover, the reduction in miles driven is larger than the reduction in fuel consumed since it appears that households cut back on the most efficient driving miles (i.e. higher speed vacation miles)).
38 Molly Espey, Explaining the Variation in Elasticity Estimates of Gasoline
Demand in the United States: A Meta-analysis, 17 Energy J. 59 (1996) (tbl. 2
shows that the average elasticity of demand for U.S. only studies at -.42).
39 See Douglas R. Bohi, Analyzing Demand Behavior: A Study of Energy
Elasticities (RFF Press 1981).
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to -. 1. In San Diego, where prices doubled during the summer of
2000, the elasticity of demand was less than -.03. A study of demand reduction in programs found elasticities to be quite low. The
41
model programs achieve elasticities in the range of -.03 to -. 1.
Long-run elasticities may be somewhat hiher, but they are generally
considered to be considerably less than -1.
The low elasticity of demand is now recognized as a critical
factor in rendering the market volatile and vulnerable to abuse. When
demand is inelastic, consumers are vulnerable to price increases, because they cannot cut back or find substitutes for their use of the
commodity.
3. Supply Is Inelastic
Short-term supply in the energy industry is also extremely
inelastic. That is, it cannot be quickly increased. The key elements
are the supply-side difficulties of production, 4transportation
and stor3
age for providing a continuous flow of energy.
40 James Bushnell & Erin Mansur, The Univ. of Cal. Energy Instit., The Impact
of Retail Rate Deregulation on Electricity Consumption in San Diego 9-15 (2001)

(a variety of models show elasticities ranging from .05 to 1).
41 Eric Hirst & Brendan Kirby, Edison Elec. Inst. and the Project for Sustainable FERC Energy Policy, Retail-Load Participation in Competitive Wholesale
Electricity Markets 6 (2001), available at http://www.hemplinglaw.com/articles/
PRDReport.pdf. and Peter M. Schwartz et al.,,, Industrial Response to Real-Time
Prices for Electricity: Short-Run and Long-Run, 40 Econ. Inquiry No. 4, 597,(
2002)).
42
Reviews of dozens of studies can be found in Bohi, supra note 39, and
Robert S. Pindyck, The Structure of World Energy Demand (MIT Press 1979). See
also Paul Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Markets For Power: An Analysis of
Electric Utility Deregulation, 156, 183 (MIT Press 1983) (concluding that many
geographic markets would exhibit market power problems, in large part because the
empirical evidence dictated the use of low elasticities of demand, in the range of.
to .5). A decade-and-a-half later, Kenneth Rose reviewed more recent literatures
and found short-run elasticities in the range of .2. Kenneth Rose, Nat'l Regulatory
Research Instit., Electric Restructuring Issue for Residential and Small Business
Customers 47 (2000) (citing E. Raphael Branch, Short Run Income Elasticity of
Residential Electricity Using Consumer Expenditure Survey Data, 14 Energy J. 11
(1993)) and long-run elasticities of about 1.0 (citing Leonard S. Hyman, Pub. Utilities Reports, America Electric Utilities: Past, Present and Future (1988)). In analyzing the California market, Borenstein and Bushnell state that "[they] have run simulations for elasticities 0.1, 0.4, and 1.0, a range covering most current estimates of
short-run and long-run price elasticity." Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, An
Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California's Electricity Industry, 47 J. of Ind. Econ. 302 (1999).
43 Fed. Trade Comm'n, Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation, 4 (2001) [here-
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Because of the nature of the underlying molecules, the production, transportation and distribution networks are extremely demanding. Energy is handled at high pressure, at high temperature
and under other physical conditions that are, literally, explosive.
These systems require integrity and real time balancing much more
than other commodities. Many sources of energy are located far from
consumers, requiring transportation over long distances. Transportation and distribution infrastructure is extremely capital intensive and
inflexible. 44 The commodities are expensive to transport and store.
They are delivered over a network that is sunk in place with limited
ability to expand in the short and medium term.
Refineries, storage facilities, pipelines and transmission grids,
and generating units are not only capital intensive, but they take long
lead times to build. They have significant environmental impacts. In
the short term, their capacity is relatively fixed. Refineries must be
reconfigured to change the yield of products. Although pipelines and
transmission grids have largely depreciated their historic, sunk costs,
expansion would be capital intensive. Thus, capacity is generally
fixed in the short and mid-terms as well.
Accidents, such as fires, explosions and breakage of equipment have a special role in networks such as these. Because of the
demanding physical nature of the network, accidents are prone to
happen. Because of the volatile nature of the commodity, accidents
tend to be severe. Because of the integrated nature of the network
and demanding real time performance, accidents are highly disruptive
and difficult to fix. But, accidents do not just happen. The tight supply-demand balance that results from industry decisions to close refineries or reduce reserve margins may also contribute directly to the
occurrence of accidents. The extremely high capacity utilization that
creates high levels of profit also puts additional stress on equip-

inafter Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation] available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2001/03/mwgasrpt.htm..
44 Douglas Gagax and Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility
Industry, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 63 (1993); Keith Gilsdorf, Testing for Subadditivity of
Vertically-Integrated Electric Utilities, 62 S. Econ. J. 126-38 (1995); J. Stephen
Henderson, Cost Estimation for Vertically Integrated Firms: the Cost of Electricity,
in Analyzing the Impact of Regulatory Change in Public Utilities (M.A. Crew ed.,
Lexington Books 1985); Erick Hirst & Brenda Kirby, Dynamic Scheduling: The
Forgotten Issue, Pub. Util. Fort., (Apr. 15, 1997); David L. Kaserman & John W.
Mayo, The Measurement of Vertical Economies and the Efficient Structure of the
Electric Utility Industry, 29 J. Indus. Econ. 483 (1991); John E. Kwoka, Jr., Power
Structure: Ownership, Integration, and Competition in the U.S. Electricity Industry
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996); Mark J. Roberts, Economies of Density and
Size in the Production and Delivery of Electric Power, 62 Land Econ. 378 (1986).
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These physical and economic characteristics render the supply-side of the market inelastic.4 6 Given the basic infrastructure of
supply in the industry, the availability of excess capacity and stocks
to meet changes in demand is the critical factor in determining the
flexibility of supply. Since output is slow to respond to price, stockpiles, storage and importation of product become critical elements of
the gasoline market.
Stocks are the key factor in policy responses to market power
where supply is inelastic. Every investigation of every product price
spike in the past several years points to "unusually low stock" as a
primary driver.47 But stock levels are no accident; they are the result
of business decisions.
Prices run up quickly because of even slight disruptions in the
supply-demand balance, and producers are slow to react because they
do not fear that others can bring the product to market and steal their
48
business. Consequently, prices are said to be "sticky downward.
The majority of published studies find support for the "rockets and
45 D. J. Peterson & Sergej Mahnovski, New Forces at Work in Refining: Indus-

try Views of Critical Business and Operations Trends 43 (RAND Corporation
2003).
46 Timothy J. Consodine & Eunnyeong Heo, Price and Inventory Dynamics in
Petroleum Product Markets, 22 Energy Econ. 527 (2000) (concluding that "supply
curves for the industry are inelastic and upward sloping.") See also Timothy J.
Consodine, Separatiblity, Functional Form and Regulatory Policy in Models of Interfuel Substitution, 11 Energy Econ. 82 (1989).
47 Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum 1996: Issues and Trends 27 (1997). The
U.S. Department of Energy identified "lower than normal gasoline stocks" in a
chapter entitled "Spring '96 Gasoline Price Runup." Energy Info. Admin., Assessment of Summer 1997 Motor Gasoline Price Increase 5 (1998); See also Midwest
Gasoline Price Investigation, supra note 43 (showing how the FTC reached a similar conclusion). In analyzing the Midwest price spike of 2000, the Department of
Energy again found stocks to be the culprit, starting an analysis entitled Supply of
Chicago/Milwaukee Gasoline Spring 2000. In explaining the early spring price runup in 2001, inventories were the starting point: "Low petroleum inventories set the
stage for our current situation, as they did last year both for heating oil and for
gasoline." Statement of John Cook, Director, Petroleum Division, U.S. Department
of Energy, Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality, H. Comm. of Energy and Commerce (May 15, 2001).
48 Energy Info. Admin., Price Changes in the Gasoline Market (1999) (reviewing several decades of studies with mixed results in the analysis of gasoline price
asymmetry - the tendency of prices to increase rapidly, but fall slowly. The report
concludes that there is strong evidence of pattern asymmetry (i.e. prices do rise
faster than they fall) but not amount asymmetry (eventually they fall back all the
way). This is not the majority view, however.).
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feathers" view. 49 Prices rise like rockets and float down like feathers 50 When energy markets become as concentrated as they are in
America, the feathers do not float all the way down.

4. Scarcity and Monopoly Rents
The problem of price shocks that afflict energy markets goes
beyond the abuse of market power. Thus, the inelasticity of supply
and demand give rise to two deviations from a typical competitive
market, creating excessive scarcity rents in addition to monopoly
rents (see Exhibit 1-6, which uses the actual electricity supply curve
for in Florida). Because of the extremely small response by supply
and demand to price changes, these markets generate large quantities
of scarcity (inframarginal) rents.

49 Barry Reilly & Robert Witt, Petrol Price Asymmetries Revisited 20 Energy

Econ. 297-298 (1998).
50 Robert W. Bacon, Rockets and Feathers: The Asymmetric Speed of Adjustment of UK Retail Gasoline Prices to Cost Changes 13 Energy Econ. 217 (1991);
Mario Galeotti et al., Rockets and Feathers Revisited: An International Comparison
on European Gasoline Markets 25 Energy Econ. 189 (2003); Severin Borenstein &
Andrea Shepard, Sticky Prices, Inventories and Market Power in Wholesale Gasoline Markets, 33 RAND J. of Econ., 116 (2002); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Energy Security and Policy: Analysis of the Pricing of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products (1993). Moreover, one fundamental difference between the price spikes of
recent years and the "rockets and feathers" debate should be underscored. In the
recent circumstances, we are not dealing with crude oil price changes alone, so the
question is not whether refiner/marketer margins "catch up," or whether some of
the change in crude oil price ends up in the refiner/marketer pockets (bottom line).
The recent price spikes have been significantly driven by refiner/marketer margins.
Even if margins return to historic levels after the spike, there is no doubt that a net
increase in marketer margins has occurred.
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Exhibit 1-6: Scarcity Rents vs. Monopoly Rents
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An economic rent is "a payment to a factor in excess of what is
necessary to keep it at its present occupation.",5 1 More importantly,
"in perfect competition, no rents are made by any factor, because
changes in supply bid prices of inputs and labor down to the level just
necessary to keep them employed., 52 In theory, these sources of
overcharges (scarcity rents) would be competed away if supply and
demand elasticities were high and energy markets worked well. In reality, because of the economic characteristics and social impacts of
the energy industry, supply and demand do not respond. The results
are elevated prices and a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers that achieve little or no real costs savings or efficiency gains.
Excessive scarcity rents accrue where changes in supply are slow or

51

George Pearce, The Dictionary of Modem Economics 124 (MIT Press

1984).
52

Graham Bannock, et al., Dictionary of Economics 128 (Penguin 1987).
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nonexistent, 53 exactly the circumstances that apply to energy markets.
The supply curve is so severe (supply is so inelastic) that the scarcity
rents make up the vast majority of the market price as demand moves
toward the peak. Supply cannot respond to price signals, thus the
owners of existing facilities just collect windfall profits.
Scarcity rents also pose a transitional problem in electricity
markets. Existing facilities have proven to be far more valuable than
their book costs, which are all that can be reflected in regulated rates.
If utilities capture those plants at book value, but can price them at
market in the future, the cost of electricity increases. The assets that
would earn these rents have gained their advantage from historic utility financing. Unless the market windfall is passed back to consumers, electricity prices increase. If they are not passed back to consumers, they can be used by incumbents as a cross-subsidy to frustrate
competition. Scarcity rents can be eliminated, e.g. taxed away' or
passed back to consumers, without harming economic efficiency.
Market power is a separate problem. The ability of producers
to withhold supply or to hold out for high prices gives them an incentive to drive prices farther above costs to increase profits, by shifting
the supply curve to the left. Distinguishing between real and artificial
scarcity becomes difficult. The markup of price over cost increases in
lock step with the reduction of available plants, even in systems with
excess capacity. 55 From the economic point of view, scarcity rents are
wealth transfers that do not contribute to economic efficiency because they are inframarginal. Monopoly rents are wealth transfers
that detract from economic efficiency. Landes and Posner concerned
53 Donald Rutherford, Dictionary of Economics 137 (Routledge 1992) (identifying the origin of the concept as being associated with land, and hence occasionally referred to as "ground rents." "As land was regarded in classic economics as
the only fixed factor of production, it alone earned rent. However, as any factor of
production can be fixed in supply, "rent" can be earned by any factor of production.
Popular examples of factors with an inelasticity of supply abound; lab[o]r can earn
economic rent as persons with rare talents (e.g. opera singers and top sports players) have high earnings largely consisting of economic rent.");.
54 Because supply of a fixed asset does not respond to price changes, there is
little or no dead weight loss. Taylor, supra note 20, at 350 ("Economic rent is the
price of anything that has a fixed supply. Economic rent is also sometimes called
pure rent. Economic rent is a significant concept in economics precisely because
the quantity supplied does not depend on the price. Thus, a tax on economic rents
would not change the amount supplied; it would not affect economic efficiency or
cause a deadweight loss.").

" Richard Rosen, et al., Tellus Inst., Can Electric Utility Restructuring Meet
the Challenges It Has Created (2000); Aleksander Rudkevich, Max Duckworth &
Richard Rosen, Tellus Inst., Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco § 6 (1997).
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themselves on6 with the deadweight efficiency loss associated with
market power, but the Merger Guidelines recognize both the wealth
transfers and the efficiency impacts of market power. From the consumer point of view, both matter.

II. Failure of Merger Review in the PETROLEUM
Industry57
A. The FTC's Lax Standard
Failing to take these market fundamentals into account, the
FTC focuses its attention on highly concentrated markets, those with
HHIs above 1800. This lax view of market concentration pervades
the FTC's analysis, as the FTC concluded in its analysis of hundreds
of mergers between 1994 and 2004:
Prime suppliers at the state level in March 2004 were either
unconcentrated or moderately concentrated (by Merger
Guidelines standards) in all but eight states and the District
of Columbia. While state-level HHI tended to increase between December 1994 and March 2004, these changes have
not resulted in HHI in the highly concentrated range.58
This interpretation of the data is a perfect example of the bias
in favor of concentrated markets. Nothing matters but highly concentrated markets. Contrast the FTC's discussion to that of the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The unit of analysis is exactly
the same - state wholesale gasoline markets (grouped by Petroleum
Administrative Defense Districts or "PADDs"). The time period is
approximately the same: 1994 to 2002. However, the discussion is
quite different:
As can be observed, the wholesale gasoline markets in 16
states in PADD I (the East Coast) were moderately concen56

Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 954 (where the cost of market power is

measured only as the deadweight loss).
57 This section draws on Mark Cooper, American Bar Association, Record
Prices: Record Oil company Profits: The Failure of Antitrust Enforcement to Protect American Energy Consumers (2004) [Hereinafter Cooper, Record Prices] and
Mark Cooper, The role of Supply, Demand, Industry Behavior and Financial Markets in the Gasoline Price Spiral, A Report Prepared for the Wisconsin Attorney
General [May 2006 (Hereinafter, Cooper, Natural Gas}.
58 FTC Report, supra note 28, at 230-1.
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trated in 2002, compared to 7 states in 1994. Also, in
PADD I, the number of states that had unconcentrated
wholesale gasoline markets decrease from 10 in 1994 to
just 1 in 2002. Some key mergers that affected PADD I
during this period include Exxon-Mobil, BP-Amoco, and
Shell-Texaco (Motiva).
In PADD II (The Midwest) the wholesale gasoline markets
in 5 states were highly concentrated, 8 were moderately
concentrated, and 2 were unconcentrated as of 2002. By
comparison, in 1994, there were no highly concentrated
markets, 7 states were moderately concentrated, and 8
states were unconcentrated in this PADD. Some key mergers that affected PADD II during this period included
Marathon-Ashland, Marathon-Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS), BP-Amoco, Shell-Texaco (Equilon) and UDSTotal.
The wholesale gasoline market in all the states in PADD III
(the Gulf Coast Region) except one had become moderately
concentrated in 2002, compared to 1994 when all were unconcentrated. Key mergers that affected PADD III during
the period include Exxon-Mobil, Shell-Texaco (Motiva),
Marathon-Ashland, and Valero-UDS.
For the States included in PADDs IV and V (the Rocky
Mountain and West Coast, respectively), wholesale gasoline markets remain in the moderately or highly concentrated range in 2002 as in 1994. Within this range, concentration levels increased in all but one state in PADD V
between 1994 and 2002. Key mergers that affected PADD
IV during this period included Shell-Texaco (Equilon),
Phillips-Tosco, Conoco-Phillips, and UDS-Total. Key
mergers that affected PADD V during the period included
Tosco-Unocal, Shell-Texaco (Eguilon), Chevron-Texaco,
Phillips-Tosco, and Valero-UDS.
Unlike the FTC, the GAO examined changes throughout the
full range of market concentrations. The GAO observed a tremen-

'9 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Energy Markets: Effects of Mergers and Market Concentration in the U.S. Petroleum Industry (2004) [hereinafter Energy Markets].
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dous shift toward moderately concentrated markets.
Exhibit 11-1 summarizes the impact of that merger wave on
refining and gasoline markets. In 1994, 47 percent of states were unconcentrated, while 43 percent were moderately concentrated and 10
percent were concentrated. By 2002, only 8 percent of markets were
unconcentrated, while 75 percent were moderately concentrated and
18 percent were highly concentrated.
Exhibit TI-i: Changes in Market Concentration
Changes in Market Concentration
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U.S. GEN.

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, ENERGY

MARKETS:

EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND MARKET CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S.
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2004)

In the aggregate, we observe that only four of the 51 markets analyzed by the FTC were unconcentrated, while nine were highly concentrated. In 30 markets, the increase in concentration was over 300
points in markets that were in the moderately concentrated range. In
another 8 markets, the increase was over 100 points in markets that
were in the moderately concentrated range. Thus, three-quarters of
the markets experienced increases in concentration that could have
resulted in an unacceptable increase in market power if the supply
and demand elasticities we have identified are taken into account.
The analysis also includes the changes in the refining markets
at the level of petroleum administrative defense districts, the traditional market for refining. It includes two submarkets that the FTC
identified separately - the Upper Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and California. Four of the
five PADDs experienced a substantial increase in concentration.
Three of the five fell in the moderately concentrated range; one fell in
the highly concentrated range. Both the submarkets exhibited a substantial increase in concentration and fell in the moderately concentrated range.
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Taken together, the increases in concentration that occurred
was in precisely the range we have identified as being important, yet
it is ignored by an analysis like that of the FTC that fails to take market fundamentals into account. State wholesale markets increased by
just over 400 points, on average to almost 1700. Refinery market increased by just under 400 points, to about 1346.
The cumulative effect of the merger wave is depicted in Exhibit 11-2. Twenty five major refiners were reduced to seven. This
analysis also takes a "big picture" point of view, assessing the overall
merger wave, something the FTC fails to do in its merger review.
Exhibit 11-2: Mergers Among FRS Companies Affecting Refining
and Natural Gas
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Source:
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/financial/mergers/
dwnstream.pdf
The FTC's focus on highly concentrated markets and large
changes in HHI is evident in its recent (1996-2003) merger review
activities (see Exhibit 11-3). The action the FTC claims to take is
generally to restore the competitive landscape to its pre-merger levels
where it perceives a threat of market power. However, if it is using
the wrong standard, it may allow mergers that increase market power
or take measures that are inadequate to prevent the exercise of market
power.
Exhibit 11-3: Federal Trade Commission Action and Inaction on
Oil Company Mergers
Post-Merger
HHI

Threshold Not
Violated
No Action Needed

Threshold Violated

Up to 1399
1400-1799
1800 -7000+

9
5
0

No Action
Taken
11
15
26

Total

14

54

Conditions Imposed
0
55
153
208

Source: FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY:
MERGERS, STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

(2004), Table 2-6.
Looking at the combination of post-merger concentration and
merger-induced change, we identified over 50 merger situations, or
about one-fifth of the total, in which the FTC took no action but
should have, based on the earlier analysis. It took no action in mergers where the HHI was below 1400. It took no action in one-fifth of
the cases when the post-merger HHI was in the range of 1400 to
1799. It took no action in one-sixth of the mergers where the postmerger market was highly concentrated.
B. Vertical Integration
The previous discussion focused on horizontal concentration.
Vertical integration between segments of the industry may have an
impact as well. Vertical integration by dominant firms may create a
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barrier to entry requiring entry at two stages of production, or foreclosing critical inputs for competitors in downstream markets. 6 1 Vertical arrangements may restrict the ability of downstream operators to
respond to local market conditions.6 2 Vertical integration not only
removes important potential competitors across stages of production,6 3 but also may trigger a wave of integrative mergers,6 rendering
small independents at any stage extremely vulnerable
to a variety of
66
attacks. 65 GAO found evidence here as well.
Gasoline markets are vulnerable to the negative effects of vertical integration. Product must move downstream from the refinery
or the tanker to the pump. Vertically integrated operations are closed
to independent sources of supply. They may impose zonal pricing
formulas or restrictions on sources of supply on their distribution outlets. 67 With vertical integration, the market may be less responsive
than it could be both in the short term, since competing product has
68
difficulty getting into individual markets at the end of a vertically
integrated chain, and in the long term because new competitors in any
market may have to enter at several stages of the business.
The GAO provides a detailed description of the changes in
60 Scherer & Ross, supra note 10, at 526 (formulating the issue as follows "[t]o

avoid these hazards, firms entering either of the markets in question might feel

compelled to enter both, increasing the amount of capital investment required for
entry.").
61 Shepherd, supra note 22, at 289-290 (describing this issue as follows:
"[o]res, special locations, or other indispensable inputs may be held by the integrated firm and withheld from others. The integration prevents the inputs from being offered in a market, and so outsiders are excluded. A rational integrated firm
might choose to sell them at a sufficiently high price.").
62 Id. at 294 (arguing that integration by large firms creates this problem. Restrictions may be set on areas, prices or other dimensions ... Only when they are
done by small-share firms may competition be increased. When done by leading
firms with market shares above 20 percent, the restrictions do reduce competition.)
63 Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, 1 Handbook
of Industrial Organization 197 (Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig eds.,
North-Holland 1989).
64 Id. at 247.
65 Scherer & Ross, supra note 10, at 526-527; Shepherd, supra note 22, at 290.
66 Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 5-9.
67 Steven Borenstein, A. Colin Cameron & Richard Gilbert, Do Gasoline
Prices Respond Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?, 112 Q. J. of Econ.
305 (1997).
68 Scherer and Ross, supra note 10, at 526-527; Shepherd, supra note 22, at
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gasoline marketing that have worked to diminish competition:
According to industry officials, two major changes have
occurred in U.S. gasoline marketing since the 1990s, partly
related to mergers. First, the availability of unbranded (generic) gasoline has decreased substantially. .69
The second change identified by industry officials is that
refiners now prefer dealing with large distributors and retailers.7 °
Consolidation at the refining level has allowed large refiners to dictate the terms of supply
contracts, including mini7
mum volume requirements. F
Distributors said that refiners who supply them with
branded gasoline preclude them from operating stations
within certain proximities of major metropolitan markets
where the refiners generally prefer to locate their companyowned and -operated and lessee dealer stations.
Academic studies corroborate the effect of market power in
specific mergers at a very micro level of analysis.73
Against this background and given the nature of the industry,
the enforcement actions the FTC takes might not effectively address
the underlying problem. Divesting to other large players who are not
in a particular market might not alleviate problems, since the industry
has so much multiple market contact that codes of behavior easily
emerge. Divesting to a smaller player within the market can have the
effect of increasing the general level of concentration in the market,
albeit less than merely allowing the merger to pass without divestiture. Because market forces are weak, this may result in an increase
69

Energy Markets, supra note 59, at 76.

70

Id. at 5.

71

Id. at 77.
Id. at 73.

72

73 Richard Gilbert & Justine Hastings, Competition Policy Ctr., Univ. of
Cal.,
Berkeley, Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising
Rivals' Costs 27 (2001); see also Justine Hastings, Competition Policy Ctr., Univ.
of California, Berkeley, Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline
Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California
(2000).
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in market power and rising prices.
C. The Impact of Petroleum Industry Consolidation
1. Gasoline
Reflecting the effects of horizontal concentration and vertical
integration, the GAO found that mergers contributed to price increases.
[The] GAO's econometric analyses show that oil industry
mergers and increased market concentration generally led
to higher wholesale gasoline prices .... Six of the eight
specific mergers GAO modeled - which mostly involved
large, fully vertically integrated companies - generally resulted in increases in wholesale prices for branded and/or
unbranded gasoline of about 2 cents per gallon, on average. .. Increased market concentration, which captures the
cumulative effect of mergers as well as other market structure factors, also generally led to higher prices for conventional gasoline, which is sold nationwide, and for boutique
fuels - that has been reformulated for certain areas on the
East Coast regions and in California to lower pollution.
The price increases were particularly large 74
in California,
where they averaged about 7 cents per gallon.
The GAO report, however, may underestimate the impact of
the merger wave on prices in the oil industry. The study considered
only the effect on wholesale gasoline prices, but changes in retail
markets may also contribute to higher prices. Its data stopped in
2000 when gasoline prices were just beginning to take off. Additional mergers took place and the price increases attributable to domestic refining and marketing sectors grew substantially thereafter.
Learning how to behave in a tight oligopoly can raise prices. The
GAO report did not consider how strategic gaming in an increasingly
consolidated industry raised the general price level, as the tight oligopoly of oil giants learned how to exploit its market power with experience. The study shows that increased refinery utilization rates
74

U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Energy Markets: Mergers and Other Factors

that Affect the U.S. Refining Industry, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resource and Regulatory Affairs, Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d0495 It.pdf
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and decreased inventories of product add a great deal to price on a
seasonal basis, but does not consider the fact that the trend of tightening markets across time, which company documents show was an intended consequence of the merger wave, raised the overall level of
price. The study shows that "supply" disruptions also have a large
impact on price, but does not consider slow reactions to disruptions
as a consequence of the merger wave.
In building its econometric model, the GAO sought to control
for other factors that might account for any observed price differences, other than increases in concentration. It found that "low gasoline inventories, high refinery capacity utilization rates and supply
disruptions increased wholesale gasoline prices."7 5 The impact is
substantial and it is quite likely that these variables are actually the
indirect effects of strategic behavior and not beyond the reach of public policy.
There is ample qualitative evidence that the mergers were intended to reduce redundant capacity.76 While the econometric approach controls for fluctuation of capacity in the short term, it does
not address the question or determine the causes of the long-term
trend of increased utilization rates and reduced inventory ratios. The
explanation given by the GAO for the observed effect underscores
the policy concern - "We found that prices were higher because high
refinery utilization rates in oil refining industry leave little room for
error in predicting short run supply."
Because the markets are insufficiently competitive, when firms make a mistake and get caught
short, they simply raise the price. There is no competitive discipline.
A March 2001 FTC report, authored by Chairman Robert Pitofsky in response to the mid-2000 gasoline price spike, noted that by
withholding supply, the oil industry was able to drive prices up and
thereby increase profits.78 The FTC identified the complex factors in
the spike and issued a warning:
The spike appears to have been caused by a mixture of
structural and operating decisions made previously (high
capacity utilization, low inventory levels, the choice of
75Energy

Markets, supra note 59, at 128.
76 Ron Wyden, The Oil Industry, Gas Supply and Refinery Capacity, More
than Meets the Eye, An Investigative Report (2001), available at
http://wyden.senate.gov/legissues/reports/wyden-oilreport.pdf (references internal memoranda from Chevron and Texaco, complaining about surplus refining capacity on the West Coast).
77 Energy Markets, supranote 59, at 139
78 Fed.Trade Comm'n, Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation (2001).
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ethanol as an oxygenate), unexpected occurrences (pipeline
breaks, production difficulties), errors by refiners in forecasting industry supply (misestimating supply, slow reactions), and decisions by firms to maximize their profits
(curtailing production, keeping available supply off the
market). The damage was ultimately limited by the ability
of the industry to respond to the price spike within three or
four weeks with increased supply of products. However, if
the problem was short-term, so too was the resolution, and
similar price spikes are capable of replication. Unless gasoline demand abates or refining capacity grows, price spikes
are likely to occur in the future in the Midwest and other
areas of the country.7 9
A 2003 RAND study of the refinery sector reaffirmed the importance of the decisions to restrict supply. It pointed to a change in
attitude in the industry, wherein "[i]ncreasing capacity and output to
gain market share or to offset the cost of regulatory upgrades is now
frowned upon." 80 In its place we find a "more discriminating approach to investment and supplying the market that emphasized
maximizing margins and returns on investment rather than product
output or market share." 8' The central tactic is to allow markets to
become tight by "relying on... existing plant and equipment to the
greatest possible extent, even if
that ultimately meant curtailing out82
put of certain refined product."
[Indeed, many RAND discussants] openly questioned the
once-universal imperative of a refinery not "going short" that is not having enough product to meet market demand.
Rather than investing in and operating refineries to ensure
that markets are fully supplied all the time, refiners suggested that they were focusing first on ensuring that their
branded retailers are adequately supplied by curtailing sales
to wholesale markets if needed8 3
The RAND study drew a direct link between long-term structural changes and the behavioral changes in the industry, drawing the

79

Id. at i-4.

80

Peterson & Mahnovski, supra note 45, at 16.

8

Id.at 42.
821d. at 17.
83

1Id. at 17.
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connection between business strategies to increase profitability and
pricing volatility. It issued the same warning that the FTC had offered two years earlier:
For operating companies, the elimination of excess capacity
represents a significant business accomplishment: low profits in the 1980s and 1990s were blamed in part on overcapacity in the sector. Since the mid-1990s, economic performance industry-wide has recovered and reached record
levels in 2001. On the other hand, for consumers, the
elimination of spare capacity generates upward pressure on
prices at the pump and produces short-term market vulnerabilities. Disruptions in refinery operations resulting from
scheduled maintenance and overhauls or unscheduled
breakdowns are more likely to lead to acute84(i.e., measured
in weeks) supply shortfalls and price spikes.
The record profits that the industry achieved in 2001 by tightening capacity and changing behavior were just the beginning of the
story (see Exhibit 11-4). Income fell in 2002 due to the severe recession following September 11, but once the economy began growing
again, refining profits exploded. By the first quarter of 2007, they
were triple the record set in 2001. Moreover, the rate of growth in of
profits on domestic refining was much faster than foreign refining.
The strategic behavior of the industry had paid off handsomely.
Exhibit 11-4: Net Income From Refining/Marketing
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Source: Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles
Tables: 2005, and Selected Financialand OperatingDatafor a Consistent Set of Energy Companies for First Quarter 2007.
Decisions about stockpiling of product are business decisions.
Stocks are measured as the number of days of demand for gasoline
held in storage. It is the stocks above this level that are available to
respond to shifts in demand or price. The reserves above the lower
operational level 85 have declined to very low levels. They generally
are in the range of a couple of days, compared to four or five days in
the early 1990s and over a week in the 1980s.
Refinery expansion has not been sufficient to alleviate the
pressure on price and this business strategy is likely to keep it that
way for at least a decade. A comment by the chairman of ExxonMobil reported in the Wall Street Journalmakes it clear that the industry
continues to behave in this anticompetitive, anti-consumer manner
and will do nothing to alleviate the pressure on the refining market:
Exxon Mobil Corp. says it believes that, by 2030, hybrid
gasoline-and-electric cars and light trucks will account for
nearly 30% of new vehicle sales in the U.S. and Canada.
That surge is part of a broader shift toward fuel efficiency
that Exxon thinks will cause fuel consumption by North
American cars and light trucks to peak around 2020 - and
then start to fall.
"For that reason, we wouldn't build a grassroots refinery,"
in the U.S. Rex Tillerson, Exxon's chairman and chief executive, said in a recent interview. Exxon has continued to
expand the capacity of its existing refineries. But a new refinery from scratch,
Exxon believes, would be bad for long86
term business.
U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum Supply Monthly 145
(2000) (defining the lower operational inventory as follows:
85

Lower operational Inventory (LOI): The lower operational inventory is the
lower end of the demonstrated operational inventory range updated for known and
definable changes in the petroleum delivery system. While not implying shortages,
operational problems or price increases, the LOI is indicative of a situation where
inventory-related supply flexibility could be constrained or non-existent. The significance of these constraints depends on local refinery capability to meet demand
and the availability and deliverability of products from other regions or foreign
sources.).
86 Jeffrey Ball, As Gasoline Prices Soar, Americans Resist Major Cuts in Con-
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Exhibit 11-5 shows the capacity utilization in the refining sector over the past two decades. The downward trend in spare capacity
began in the mid 1980s as a result of policies to eliminate subsidies to
keep capacity on line and dispersed in ownership and geography.
The decline continued through the late 1990s and the refining industry has maintained an extremely low level of spare capacity compared
to all industry. All industry carries about 2.5 times the amount of
spare capacity. The irony is that petroleum products, with their low
elasticities, are particularly vulnerable to this tight market situation.
Exhibit 11-5: Spare Capacity in Refining v. All Industry
30
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uj20
'15S105
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Source: Calculated from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, IndustrialProduction
and Capacity Utilization; Energy Information Administration, U.S.
Department of Energy, U.S. Percent Utilization of Refinery Operable
Capacity.
This pattern of behavior is not restricted to investments in refining. As the Wall Street Journal noted in mid-2004, "with prices
soaring as much as 50 percent.. .oil titans from Texas to Tehran are
awash in record revenue. But as the money floods in, they are spend-

sumption, Wall St. J., May 1, 2006, at A-i, A-13.
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ing little extra in finding and extracting more petroleum."87 Just as
we have seen in the refining sector, where companies will not invest
to expand refinery capacity that might put downward pressure on
price, the same mentality afflicts the companies in the production
sector. The companies call it "capital discipline, 9988 but it means a
tight market and a permanent condition of excess profits. The Wall
Street Journal cites a Chevron/Texaco spokesperson, defending the
fact that "the company has made no major shifts in investment plans
because of the price boom. 'Our long-term price guidelines are
around the low $20s' for U.S. benchmark crude." 89 The Journal
points out that this is "well below the average of $29 at which oil has
traded since 2000. "9o The result of the refusal to invest in production
capacity has "led to one of the biggest potential disconnects between
91
supply and demand in the 150-year history of the oil business."
Other industry analysts have similar concerns.
For several years oil producers have proved reluctant to
match their spending to expected demand, says John
Westwood, chief executive of British energy industry consultant Douglas-Westwood. Mr. Westwood traces part of
the dearth in spending to oil companies' recent merger
binge, where they bought growth through acquisitions
rather than exploration... "As far as we're concerned, this

is not a real [supply] crunch. This is just a practice.

92

The New York Times underscored the consternation of some
with a front page headline "An Oil Enigma: Production Falls Even ' as
93
Reserves Rise: No Clear Picture Emerges to Explain Discrepancy."
Ironically, it selected Chevron/Texaco to illustrate the fact that oil
companies were producing less of their reserves. The turning point
Awash in a Gusher of Cash, Oil firms Are Reluctant Investors, Wall St. J.,
August 26, 2004, at A-1, A-2.
88 Id.; ExxonMobil, 2005 Annual Report 5 (2006); Chevron, 2005 Annual Report 2 (2006) (using the term "capital discipline") [Hereinafter Awash].
87

" Awash, supra note 87, at A-2.
90 Id.

9' Id. at Al.
92

Susan Warren,

Fear Factor in the Oil Industry is Driver Behind Rising

Prices, Wall St. J., June 3, 2004, at A-4.
93 Alex Berenson, An Oil Enigma: Production Falls Even as Reserves Rise,
N.Y. Times, June 12, 2004.
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was 2000. Strategic behavior was clearly in evidence.
2. Natural Gas
This pattern of behavior was not limited to oil. The mergers
and subsequent strategic behavior affected natural gas as well. When
"The Majors' Shift to Natural Gas," 94 as an Energy Information Administration document put it, behavior in the industry changes. With
the entry of major producers into the market, investment patterns
changed. Investment decisions largely determined the state of the resource base. With majors shifting their focus in the late 1990s, production exceeded reserve additions, creating the condition for a tightening of the market. When prices began to rise, the response was
slow. As Standard and Poor's noted in 2004:
It is unclear that producers are investing enough to grow
production materially - and this follows a year [2003] in
which the domestic gas production (including acquisitions)
of integrated producers appears to have declined...
[M]ajor integrated companies, which appear to be reinvesting only 30 to 40 percent of their domestic cash flow in the
United States, have made strategic decisions to allow their
shallow-water and onshore natural gas production to deplete to redeploy capital to international (mainly oil) projects.9 5
The majors -BP-Arco-Amoco, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-GettyTexaco, ConocoPhilips - were lagging in the effort to replace their
reserves.96 Listing the names reminds us of how many firms disappeared in the merger wave of 1996-2002. These four majors
97 accounted for about half of all the gas marketed in North America.
Drilling activity does respond to price increases, but it has
been muted. Since 1999, which saw the lowest natural gas price in
the past decade, there has been a doubling of the rig count, compared
94 Energy Information Administration, The Majors Shift to Natural Gas (Sep-

tember 2001)
95 Jeff Beattie, U.S. Oil and Gas Producers Investing in Mergers, Not More
Drilling - S&P, Energy Daily, Apr. 26, 2004.
96 Mark Cooper, Midwest Attorneys Gen. Natural Gas Working Group, The
Role of Supply, Demand and Financial Commodity Markets in the Natural Gas
Price Spiral,39-45 (2006) (Hereinafter Cooper, Natural Gas).
97 Gas Daily 7, December 12, 2005.
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to a six-fold increase in the price of oil and a similar increase in the
price of natural gas. Nevertheless, the rig count was higher in 19961999 when the price was less than half of what it was in 2005. The
implicit elasticity of the supply of rigs with respect to price is considerably less than one. Rigs drilling for natural gas show not only a
faster rate of growth, but also a larger price increase. 98 The long period of low levels of drilling, followed by the rapid expansion, contributes to the inefficient and sluggish response. Capacity is destroyed during the down cycle and then the rush to increase capacity
increases the cost.
"When price returns get high enough, people expand capacity. The returns are the highest we've seen for land rigs in
a few decades..." Manufacturers building new rigs can expect a return of 25% to 30%.99
Drilling rig day rates have doubled since 2000 and new rigs
are available only if a producer is 100
willing to guarantee longterm leasing at these higher rates.
At the same time, it is clear that price increases have far outstripped the increases in costs. 10 1 As an analysis in the New York
0 2
Times under the headline "High Profits, Sluggish Investments,"'
pointed out after the announcement of yet more record profits, "[tihe
real issue, though, is not how much the oil companies are making, but
what they are doing with the money. In too many cases, they seem to
have only a limited interest in investing it in projects that might help
prevent or ameliorate a new energy crisis."1 The article noted that
Exxon essentially decides what to invest based on its projections of
prices and "Exxon's price forecasts have not risen much in recent
years, even though market prices have soared."' 1 4 The dramatic shift
in behavior among the majors is also unprecedented. "I checked back
98

Foster Report No. 2538 at 2.

99 Gas Drilling Drives Market for New, Rebuilt Rigs, Gas Daily, Feb.7, 2006,
at 6.
100

Independent Producers Spell Out Efforts to Address Natural Gas Market Is-

sues in Wake of Storms, Foster Report No. 2563, Oct. 20, 2005, at 20.
10'Cooper, Natural Gas, supra note 96, at 35-39
102

Floyd Norris, High Profits, Sluggish Investment, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2006,

at C-1.
103

Id.

104

id.
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to 1976, and found that until 1997, Exxon always invested
more than
0 5
it made. Now it invests less than half of its profits."'
Exxon's ability to choose its target price and not fear that it
will lose out to others who act more aggressively is one indication of
its market power. The fact that Exxon invested more than it earned
until the onset of industry consolidation in the mid- 1990s underscores
the fact that companies generally use two major sources of cash to
invest in an industry. Depreciation, which is the return of capital, and
net income, or return on capital, are the two primary streams of cash
flow.
3. The Cost of the Price Run-up
The structural conditions in the domestic gasoline industry
have only gotten worse as demand continues to grow and mergers
have been consummated. Increases in prices and industry profits
should come as no surprise. Given these broader concerns, the GAO
study may severely underestimate the impact of the mergers on gasoline prices. An approach that gives a broader perspective is to examine the domestic spread on gasoline. The domestic spread is the difference between the pump price of gasoline, minus taxes, and the cost
of crude oil. It represents the amount that the domestic industry takes
for refining and marketing. The bulk of this comes in the refining
sector. Exhibit 11-6 shows the domestic spread against a baseline of
the average for the 1990 to 1999 period. The increase in the domestic
spread was just under 18 cents per gallon, raising the price at the
pump by over $170 billion in the 2000-2006 period.
Exhibit 11-6 also shows the domestic ratchet in natural gas. I
isolate the effect of crude oil using the historic relationship of crude
to natural gas. The projected price for natural gas is based on the historic ratio of crude to gas of 10 to 1. This backs out the effect of
crude price changes, although the link between natural gas and crude
prices has been eroded over time. 106 The increase in natural gas
prices in the 2000-2006 period was about $1.50 per thousand cubic
feet (mcf) for a total of more that $235 billion. The total for these
two vital energy commodities is $400 billion.
This price increase translated into increased profits. In the period between 1985 and 1999 the major oil companies earned a return
on equity of about 3 percentage points less than the Standard and
Poors Industrials. The historic pattern over fifteen years, where oil
companies earned somewhat less than the S&P Industrials is, in fact,
105id.
106

Cooper, Record Prices, supra note 57, at 21-28.

358

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 19:4

the proper baseline. The return on equity should reflect the underlying risk in the sector. Wall Street measures riskiness by the variability of profits (measured by the Beta),107 and the major oil companies
are well below the average by this measure. The reason is that demand for oil is highly inelastic - it does not fluctuate widely. Competition is weak and barriers to entry are high. As a result, the oil industry faces less business risk than other large companies.
The industry has set records for profits year after year since
the turn of the 21 st century (see Exhibit 11-7). Five of the six most
profitable years since the oil embargo of 1973 have occurred since
2000. The total increase in pre-tax profits exceeds $200 billion, using the historic relationship of return on equity for oil companies
compared to the S&P industrials.
Exhibit 11-6: The Upward Spiral of Domestic Petroleum Product
Prices
The Domestic Spread on Gasoline
120

100

19 Cents per gallon increase
equals more than $170 billion
80-

z10 60'

-- Actual a Histoic Average

107

Wikipedia - Beta Coefficient, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beta coefficient.
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Domestic Ratchet in Natural Gas
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Source: Mark Cooper Record Prices: Record Oil Company Profits:
The Failure of Antitrust Enforcement to Protect American Energy
Consumers (September 2004), at 21-28.
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Exhibit 11-7: Major Oil Company Return on Equity is Far Above
Historic Levels
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Sources: Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles
of major Energy Producers: 2005 (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Department of Energy, December 2006); company annual reports to estimate 2006.
The picture is even more distressing when one looks at cash
flow - which is made up almost entirely of the return of and on capital. 10 8 The majors simply cannot absorb the flood of cash. The increase in expenditures on exploration and development in the U.S.
and Canada, which will do the most for natural gas markets in the
U.S., is dwarfed by the increase in cash flow, as are total capital expenditures. The excess cash flow goes into increasing cash hoards,
mergers and acquisitions, dividends and buy-backs of stock.
We do not see the level of increased domestic production
activity from the international majors and certain large
North American independents that we would expect to see
in a rational, competitive marketplace at current gas prices,
which have been at a sustained average annual price of
greater than $5.00 per MMBtu since mid-2002... The
flight overseas by dollars realized from domestic gas prices
realized since 2000.. .effectively means that the American
consuming public is financing international projects. Such
activity, in turn, helps to support the continued high level of
domestic gas prices by resulting in a reduced level of domestic production with an increased per-unit cost than
would otherwise be indicated by the level of domestic
prices. 109
"Most of the large integrated and larger majors are building
up cash. After having gone through the exercise of debt reduction, share buybacks, and dividend increases, the companies are still looking at sizeable cash flow...

108 When an investment is depreciated, the capital is returned to the investor.
Wikipedia - Depreciation, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depreciation. This return
of capital is a major source of cash flow. Return on capital or investment is the income that companies earn and a second major source of cash flow. Wikipedia Return on Investment, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Returnon-investment.
109James R. Choukas-Bradley & Michael Donnelly, City of Mesa, A Report on
Projected Natural Gas Prices and Dynamics of the Natural Gas Market for 2005
and Beyond (2005), available at http://www.cityofmesa.org/utilities/gas/pdf/
PROJECTED-NATURAL-GAS-PRICES-RPT.pdf.
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"We believe that this cash build-up, and the lack of attractive new places to10invest, will fuel more merger and acquisition activities."'
Looking at capital spending patterns for both exploration and
acquisitions, on industry analysis noted that "M&A spending did
draw a greater share of the funds, nearly all at the expense of development outlays."' 111
D. The Trigger for the Price Explosion
When the extremely low elasticities identified earlier in this
paper are highlighted, the question immediately arises, "why don't
energy companies push prices higher?" It would appear that they are
leaving rents on the table. Because they are not extracting every
penny, some argue that there must not be market power present.
There is also the question of the sudden onset of the pricing pattern
when the problem had been building. Is there a trigger?
The answer to both questions is that the exercise of market
power is as much a political process as an economic one. Pricing,
especially for commodities as vital as energy, must not elicit political
reactions. The oil companies had been accumulating market power,
and the election of an industry-friendly administration was a signal
that more could be extracted (See Exhibit 11-8).
There is no doubt that the arrival of the Bush Administration
in 2001 represented a dramatic shift in policy. The National Energy
Policy Development Group was formed under Vice President Cheney
in the spring of 2001.'12 Crude oil prices were well off their historic
highs at that moment, while the domestic spread was at the first of
several peaks. 113 Nevertheless, when the National Energy Policy Development Group released its report, the underlying problem was portrayed as one in which "over-dependence on any one source of energy, especially a foreign source, leaves us vulnerable to price14
shocks, supply interruptions and in the worst case, blackmail."',
"0 Analyst Expects Active Year for E &P Mergers, Gas Daily, Jan. 17, 2006,
at 1-6.
111Study: North American Gas Producers Lead Pack, Gas Daily, Sept. 27,
2005, at 4.
112 National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy
(2001).
113

Cooper, Record Prices, supra note 57 at 23-24.

114

President George W. Bush, Remarks at the River Centre Convention Center

by the President to Capital City Partnership (May 17, 2001) (transcript available at
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The resulting policy recommendations were tilted strongly in favor of
the industry. 5 The Vice President quickly became embroiled in
controversy over questions of excessive industry influence in its deliberations, a dispute
that went all the way to the Supreme Court of
16
the United States.'
The high level of engagement by energy industry executives,
like former Enron's CEO Kenneth Lay, in securing the rapid appointment of a new Chairman at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") and in gaining access to the policy process
was another favorable signal

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010517-2.html ); Mike Allen
& Dana Milbank, Bush Issues Energy Warning; President Unveils New Policy, to
Praise and Attacks on Party Lines, Wash. Post, May 18, 2001.
115 Mark Leibovich, The Strong, Silent Type; Vice President Cheney Doesn't
Suffer Small Talk When He's Looking at the Big Picture, Wash. Post, Jan. 18,
2004, at F-3. Secretary of the Treasury O'Neill recounts that the Vice President
responded to the criticism of some of the administration policies with the blunt
statement that, "[w]e won the mid-terms [elections], this is our due." The quote is
from Secretary of the Treasury O'Neill's account of vice President Cheney's reaction to O'Neill's complaint that the tax cuts would create a severe fiscal crisis.
116 Supreme Court to Hear Cheney Task Force Case, Energy Daily, Dec. 16,
2003.
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Exhibit 11-8: The Political Trigger for the Energy Price Spiral
The Domestic Spread on Gasoline
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to the industry." 7 The initial refusal and delay of the administration
to recognize that manipulation had played a large part in the California energy crisis and the delayed and minuscule penalties imposed
sent another signal to the oil industry." 8 The timid approach the
FERC took in response to
9 reports of natural gas price manipulation
reinforced the message."
The Bush Administration also moved quickly to roll back air
conditioner efficiency standards that had been set by the Clinton Administration. These would have curbed the demand for electricity reducing the need for as many as 50 power plants. They would have
particularly affected natural gas consumption, since summer peaking
demand draws heavily on natural gas.
Vice President Cheney
made the administration's lukewarm attitude toward energy efficiency clear, when he relegated it to "a personal choice," not a policy
option. The Administration ultimately lost a court battle over this decision, but the signal could not have been stronger, and the long fight
against the rule underscored how committed they were to not following this path.
The tilt toward the industry reached its zenith in the administration's energy bill, which did not pass until 2005. As one longterm observer of Washington energy policy put it, "[s]ome blame
must rest with the White House and Vice President Cheney, whose
task force, meeting in secret with energy industry leaders, wrote the

117

Transcript of interview with Ken Lay, Frontline (PBS television broadcast

June 6, 2001); George Lobenz, "Documents Detail Enron Push for Wood,
Brownell," Energy Daily, August 2, 2004.
118 See Teena Davis, Dynegy Settle Power Fight with California, Energy Daily,
Apr. 28, 2004. The California Attorney General reached a settlement with Dynegy
for $280 million to settle complaints about price manipulation in about 6 months in
2000-2001. Included in the total was a settlement of $3 million that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission had reached with Dynegy. In other words, the
FERC has agreed to just about one penny on the dollar of the ultimate abuse (see
Davis, Teena, "Dynegy Settle Power Fight with California," Energy Daily, April
28, 2004).
119 Jeff Beattie, FERC Still Unsure About Reliability of Gas Price Reporting,
Energy Daily, Nov. 5, 2003.
120 Toru Kubo, Harvey Sachs & Steven Nadel, Am. Council for an EnergyEfficient Econ., Opportunities for New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards: Energy and Economic Savings Beyond Current Standards Programs (2001),
available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/a0l6execsum.pdf.; Steve Nadel & Howard
Geller, Am. Council for an Energy-Efficient Econ., Smart Energy Policies: Saving
Money and Reducing Pollutant Emissions through Greater Energy Efficiency
(2001), available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e012execsum.pdf.
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libretto for the bill."' 2 1 The central premise of the energy bill pushed
by the administration was that energy companies need more money to
boost production of domestic energy supplies. To that end, a grab
bag of subsidies - totaling over $20 billion - was earmarked for the

oil and gas industr, while other expensive alternatives would also
receive assistance.
On the natural gas side, the bill promoted
costly backstop technologies, like liquefied natural gas imports and
an Alaska natural gas pipeline, which would lock in high gas prices.
These signals were in sharp contrast to the reaction of the
Clinton Administration to the early signs of trouble in energy markets
in 2000. As discussed above, after approving many of the mergers
that led to the consolidation in the industry, President Clinton appointee Robert Pitofsky had issued a tough FTC report on the gasoline price spikes in the upper Midwest in the summer of 2000.123 The
Department of Energy had begun to express serious concerns about
the abuse of market power in the electricity industry.' 24 Similarly,
the Clinton Administration created a heating oil reserve for the
Northeast, another sign that it would take a stronger stance against
the industry. In short, while the Clinton Administration and its antitrust agencies had been lax, too, they did not have an energy price
problem until the last moment. They reacted by becoming critical of
the industry to some extent and by taking steps to alleviate prices.
The Bush administration eliminated all criticism of the industry and
adopted its spin, backed up with policies that were industry-friendly.

121Llewellyn King, The Energy Pig-Out Has Been Delayed, Energy Daily,

Dec. 2, 2003.
122 Id. (identifying half a dozen columnists and newspapers who are usually
strong supporters of President Bush who find the bill unacceptable).
123Fed. Trade Comm'n, Midwest Gasoline, supra note 43, at i-4..
124

Energy Info. Admin., Horizontal Market Power in Restructured Electricity

Markets (2000), available at http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/HMPReport.pdf.
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III. LAX Oversight Over Commodity Trading in
12
Natural Gas

A. Act One: Opening the Door to Abuse
The setting of wholesale natural gas prices through trading in
commodity markets is a recent phenomenon. The first natural gas
market center, known as the Henry Hub, was set up in 1988, soon after deregulation of "old gas" in 1985. Hubs are locations where natural gas pipelines meet and the services necessary to physically exchange natural gas are located for traders who want to take delivery.
The wellhead price of natural gas was not fully decontrolled until
1989. Early in 1990, the first natural gas futures were traded on the
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) (see Exhibit 111-1).
A close look at the timing of the changes in trading activities
and the movement of prices shows a coincidence that is just too striking to ignore. Exhibit 111-1 overlays key points in the short history of
natural gas commodity markets on the price history.
Natural gas prices were stable throughout the 1990s. While
there were a couple of spikes in spot markets in the 1990s, spot and
futures prices generally tracked the wellhead price closely in a narrow range of $2 - $3 per thousand cubic feet (mcf). After a slow
1 26
start, these markets were said to be efficient in a technical sense.
This pattern came to a dramatic end in the spring of 2000.
Electricity deregulation emerged in the mid-1990s while the
FERC pressed deregulation and unbundling of natural gas pipeline
markets, particularly in California. The California electricity deregulation and crisis, which was interrelated with natural gas prices, put
pressure on these commodity markets.

125

This section draws heavily on Mark Cooper, Responding to Turmoil in

Natural Gas Markets: The Consumer Case for Aggressive Policies to Balance Supply and Demand (December 2004) and Cooper, Natural Gas, supra note 57.
126 John H. Herbert, The Relations of Monthly Spot to Futures Prices for Natural Gas, 18 Energy 1119-1124 (1993).
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Exhibit 111-1: Wellhead Prices And Major Changes In Trading
Activity
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Soon thereafter Enron launched its Enron Online trading platform in November 1999. It had moderate levels of trading, about $50
billion, through the first half of 2000. Subsequently, Enron's total
trading exploded. In the first half of 2001, it did over ten times as
much - half a trillion dollars. 2 7 Prices skyrocketed as well. Volumes
escalated sharply and Enron played a key role. As a New York Times
article noted, "[s]ome traders have said that Enron' 28
Online was dominant enough to enable Enron to set market prices."'
While the Western electricity markets attracted the most headDonald Murray and Zhen Zhu, Enron Online and Informational Efficiency
in the U.S. Natural Gas Market, Energy J.,
Jan. 1, 2004.
128 Alexei Barrionuevo, Energy Trading Without a Certain "E," N.Y. Times,
127

Jan. 15, 2005, at 3.
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lines and revealed the most blatant abuses in terms of withholding of
physical supplies and bogus trades, natural gas markets were not immune. Enron played a large role in these markets and when it collapsed, so too did much private trading.1 29 A court ruling allowing a
lawsuit against Enron for abuse of commodity markets can be used to
make the point: "Enron was positioned to yank prices up because its
Enron Online [EOL] trading platform controlled fully 40 percent of
average daily trading on the Henry Hub natural gas spot market. Further, other traders in that market "routinely looked to EOL and Enron
for current [Henry Hub] spot market pricing information," according
to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) complaint. 30 The Henry Hub is the most important price setting spot
market in the nation. This market share of activity by a single entity
would virtually ensure that the hub was highly concentrated at that
time.
In the spring of 2000, natural gas prices at the wellhead began
a sustained period above $3 that lasted for sixteen months. The average price of natural gas in 2000-2001 was about twice the price of the
previous decade. Spot market prices peaked at four times the average
of the previous decade. Coincidentally, this was the period in which,
it later came to light, a number of companies were manipulating or
attempting to manipulate the market.
Although Enron-style trading had earlier received some exemptions from oversight, the biggest long-term change in 2000 was
not the spike in natural gas prices. Rather, it was the passage of the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA). While the CFMA
did not change the legality of many of the activities that were taking
place, it made it more difficult to detect them and it opened the door
to many other types of transactions that raise concerns. As one analyst put it:
What did the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
(CFMA) of 2000 do?
First, let me point out that the over-the-counter market in
derivatives has never been adequately regulated. The market emerged only recently, and most of its growth has occurred in the past fifteen years. At first, this market was
largely ignored by regulators, and after it grew to a size that
129

Energy Info. Admin., The Natural Gas Industry and Markets in 2002 2

(2004), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/features/ngmarkets.pdf.
130 Jeff Beattie, Judge Green Lights Lawsuit, Energy Daily, Mar. 15, 2004, at
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demanded it be addressed, the regulators found it difficult
to define the line of jurisdiction over the markets because
of poorly written laws and richly endowed political opponents to such regulation.
Before passage of the bill in December 2000, the government retained authority over fraud and manipulation in the
over-the-counter derivatives markets. In addition, market
participants were restricted under Rule 35 from conducting
over-the-counter markets like an exchange.
The CFMA was a major bill that drastically reduced the
level of prudential regulation of derivatives markets. It reduced transparency and the government's surveillance
abilities over exchange-traded derivatives, and it completely eliminated or "excluded" federal derivatives regulation of the over-the-counter market. Enron operated in that
completely deregulated environment. 131
This concern about the deregulation and lax government oversight of natural gas trading markets extends to consumers, including
electric utilities 32 and large industrial users express similar concerns. 133The law paved the way for abuse and the criticism is not lim131Randall Dodd, Untangling Enron: The Reforms We Need, 45 Challenge 7273 (2002), available at http://www.financialpolicy.org/DSCChallengeEnronMar2002.pdf.
132 For example, in pushing for reform of the Act, the American Public Gas

Association argues "Passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
has significantly changed natural gas markets. As a result, we believe that the
CFTC should be given additional authority to oversee and carefully monitor markets. Given the abuses in energy markets we have seen over the past several years,
strong market oversight is more important than ever to protect consumers and ensure that markets are functioning properly. American Public Gas Association
Wants More Done to Determine How Financial and Physical Markets Affect Natural Gas Prices, Foster Report No. 2573, Jan. 6, 2006, at 15.
133Natural gas traders on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) were
sharply criticized for "fostering high and volatile natural gas prices at U.S. consumers' expense" by Peter Huntsman, President and CEO of the corporation bearing his name... Mr. Huntsman charged, "hedge funds and other paper traders on the
New York Mercantile Exchange continue to enrich themselves while U.S. gas consumers are forced to endure the result of the world's highest and most volatile natural gas prices.... Mr. Huntsman is "surprised" that more natural gas consumers are
not "outraged" over the imbalance in the U.S. economy created by a "natural gas
pricing system that has been out of control since Congress enacted the Commodities Futures Modernization Act in 2000. No Reason for Natural Gas Prices to be so
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ited to users and their advocates. A similar sentiment was expressed
in a 2005 article in the Journalof Futures Markets.
Many scholars have recognized the cash-settlement manipulation problem, but few have formally addressed it.
The lack of interest may be due to the fact that, until recently, most U.S. exchange-traded cash-settled derivative
contracts were based on broad indices of very liquid stocks.
Manipulation of such instrument requires very large trades
that are costly to make and easy to detect through conventional surveillance.
The prospects for manipulation increased substantially with
the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 (Act). The Act authorized trading in single-stock
futures and narrow-based index instruments, and the Act
specifically permitted cash settlement. These new instruments will not necessarily have liquid underlying securities.
Further, all else equal, fewer numbers of1 34
securities will be
easier to manipulate than larger numbers.
The over-the-counter derivatives market in natural gas is a derivative that rests on a narrow base, whose liquidity at key moments
is unclear, and is subject to no surveillance whatsoever.
Between the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2005, two
dozen companies settled over thirty CFTC complaints of market manipulation or attempts to manipulate the natural gas market with fines
running in excess of $4 billion. The cases involved:
*

*
*
*

the misreporting of information about storage, pipeline
capacity and both the quantity and price of natural gas
trades;
abuse of affiliate relations;
the improper sharing of insider information; and
manipulation and charging of illegal prices.

there are a
These are the trading market abuses. In addition,
35
pending.!
and
proven
violations
securities
of
number
High and Volatile, Huntsman Declares, Foster Report No. 2544, June 9, 2005, at

21.
134Hans

R. Dutt and Lawrence E. Harris, Position Limits for Cash-Settled De-

rivative Contracts, 25 J. Futures Mkts. 945, 948 (2005).
135

A list of over 30 cases involving $4.4 billion of payments by natural gas
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B. Act Two: A Green Light for Unregulated Trading
By late 2001, signs of trouble at Enron were evident and trading began to dry up. In December 2001, bankruptcy shut down the
trading platform. Trading did not recover for a period. "In February
2002, shortly after Enron declared bankruptcy, UBS took over Enron's natural gas and power trading operation and Enron Online.
With little volatility to trade around, UBS started firing traders and
switched off the Internet trading platform. By May 2003, UBS had
closed the Houston operation ."1

The historically high prices of 2000-2001 were not sustained.
By the winter of 2002 the national economy was in a recession. The
Enron-generation of energy traders was slipping into bankruptcy.
The market evaporated in mid-2002 under suspicions of manipulation
and fraudulent accounting. The trading aspect of the electricity and
natural gas industries quickly returned to the relative safety of trading
around assets and marketing activities. 137 These behaviors are derisively called a "flight to quality."' 138 Perhaps not so coincidentally,
prices moderated in 2002, declining by 25 percent on average, but
settling about 50 percent higher than the decade of the 1990s. The
relationship between crude oil prices and natural gas prices had
moved back toward the average of the 1990s.
For some, the collapse of Enron Online and the merchant
traders represented a loss, even a crisis. 139 To speculators this looked
like an alarming situation of illiquidity. By late 2003 the big banks
and large speculators began to enter and accelerate trading to deliver
the consumer from the doldrums of low, stable prices. Again, public
policy opened the door.
In the post-Enron period the rules of entry were relaxed to let
more entities into these lightly regulated or unregulated markets.
Some lawmakers and consultants argue the government has
done little to shore up the energy markets most susceptible
to manipulation. The Federal Reserve relaxed rules in 2003
so that Commercial banks like Citigroup could take possescompanies to settle allegations of market manipulation is available from the author
on request.
136 Barrionuevo, supra note 128, at 3.
Peter Fusaro, Hedge Funds: The Next Wave in Energy Trading, 3 PRMIA:
Members Update 1, at 4 (July 2004).
137

138 Peter Fusaro & Gary Vasey, Energy Comes into Focus for Hedge Funds,

UtiliPoint: Analysts Comer, Dec. 17, 2004, at 1.
139 See Murria and Zhu, supra note 127.
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sion of physical commodities like oil in storage
tanks .... The move allowed the banks to serve as dealers
in commodity derivatives ....
"It is an effort by banks to move into the terrain that Enron
abandoned in their bankruptcy ....
As early as October 2002, less than a year after Enron declared bankruptcy, the Commodity Futures Trading Comcommodity hedge
mission started to write rules exempting
40
funds from regulatory oversight. 1
It appears that trading activity began to revive in late 2003
and price began to lift off again141 The massive influx of hedge
funds appears to have ramped up in mid 2004 followed by the 2005
skyrocketing of prices. 14 2 After a hiatus of a year or so, the volume
of trading increased dramatically and by mid-2004 it had returned to
the level reached at the point of the collapse of the Enron generation
of traders. This time trading was dominated by a completely new set
of players - investment bankers and multinational oil and gas companies. As trading and prices began to mount, the hedge funds moved
in. It appears that the number of energy hedge funds increased from
about 100 to over 400,143 and those specializing in energy commodity
trading increased from 10 to over 200.'44The volume of trading in
over-the-counter markets has exploded. One estimate of over-thecounter trading through a NYMEX platform shows a sevenfold in-

140
Barrionuevo, supra note 128, at 3.
141 See Id.Wall Street banks are notoriously fickle about their commitment to
commodities trading. But the eye-popping profits earned by the market leaders,
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, have spurred other banks to get into the
game. In 2004, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley earned about $2.6 billion
combined from commodities trading, most of that from energy. Id.
142 Id. The new hedge funds are sucking scarce talent away from the banks. At
least 450 hedge funds with an estimated $60 billion in assets are focused on energy
and the environment, including 200 devoted exclusively to various energy strategies. Id.
143Peter Fusaro & Gary Vasey, Energy Hedge Fund Ctr., Energy Hedge
Funds: Its All About Risk/Reward 5, www.http://energyhedgefunds.com/
ehfc/modules/articles-4/content/EHFCarticle.pdf.
144Matthew Serynek, Investors Beware: What You Need to Know Before Investing in Energy, The Desk, Dec. 2005, at 37.
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crease between June 2003 and June 2005.145
As a run-up to the trial of the top Enron executive, The New
York Times ran a front-page Business Section article entitled "Energy
Trading, Without a Certain 'E', ''146 describing the activities of energy
hedge funds against the backdrop of Enron noting that "some industry officials question whether the funds are contributing to higher energy prices, or at least stoking more price volatility." 14,
While the "E" in the New York Times headline intended to refer to Enron, it actually could stand for two more important "Es," energy or equity. Huge sums of energy futures contracts are traded
without being backed by the underlying assets or equity, which was
Enron's game. Because there are few requirements for backing, entry
is extremely easy and trading can escalate rapidly. The price may be
bid up, as suggested by the New York Times:
But with that revival comes questions from some financial
market analysts about whether energy trading will be better
able to withstand another potential meltdown ....[T]he lat-

est ramp-up in trading has also been marked by an air of
secrecy underscored by the proliferation of hundreds of
hedge funds that are speculating on everything from crude
oil to electricity in both regulated and unregulated markets.
Many funds are being aided by investment from banks,
which are also buying up distressed power plants and other
remnants of the collapsed sector ....
A debate continues to rage about whether the hedge funds
are contributing to higher energy prices. The funds are borrowing as much as 10 times what they invest in some
trades, analysts and traders say, contributing to short-term
volatility that has complicated
the energy purchases of
14 9
many large energy users.

This quote suggests the complexities of natural gas financial
markets. First, large quantities of natural gas are traded in two kinds
of markets - over-the-counter (OTC) and on exchanges. The OTC
market is unregulated. The exchanges are regulated, but many be145Id.

146 Barrionuevo, supra note 128, at 3.
147Id.
148Id.
149

id..
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lieve that regulation is too lax. 150 Second, the juxtaposition of hedge
funds and large users highlights the distinction between financial instruments and the physical commodity. Third, the quote also highlights the essential characteristic of derivatives. 151 "Unlike their respective underlying commodities.. .however, derivatives are
sometimes preferred as a trading tool for their leveraging capability.
Leverage, in financial terms, is the effect of magnifying the outcome
52
of an investment through the use of borrowed funds (credit)."1
While the analysts who hype the energy trading are adamant
that this liquidity is good for the markets, they at least admit that it
might "accentuate" upward trends. However, their descriptions are a
cause for even greater concern.
Hedge funds bring increased sophistication, liquidity, and
the risk culture and trading acumen to bear on energy
commodities markets. Seeking new opportunities to obtain
greater returns, hedge funds see energy markets as providing that opportunity. Likewise, the investment banks have
a risk trading culture, deep pockets, and access to both
physical and financial traders. Even the energy companies
with surviving trading arms are now partnering with investment banks to sustain and improve trading operations
while obtaining access to increased expertise, more sophisticated tools, and risk capital. Moreover, we have the multinational oil and gas companies with the balance sheet to
put their capital at risk. It is no accident that BP is the No.
1 gas trader and in the top five in power trading; BP has the
balance
sheet and supply to play in this new financial mar153
ket.
The influx of new money and traders was massive. 15 4 When
risk capital seeking higher returns starts to chase a commodity like
150 See supra,notes 132 and 133.
151 The CFTC Glossary: A Guide to the Language of the Futures Industry,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/
opa/cftcglossary.pdf. A derivative is "a financial instrument, traded on or off an
exchange," that involves "the trading of rights or obligations based on the underlying product, but do not directly transfer property."

152 Fletcher, J. Sturm, Trading Natural Gas 31 (1997).
153Peter

Fusaro, The Rise of Financial Energy Trading Markets: Enter the
Hedge Funds, INSIGHT, Oct. 2005, at 2.
154 Analysts: Funds Altered the Face of Trading in '05, Gas Daily, Jan. 3, 2006,
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natural gas that is relatively fixed in supply and demand in the short
and mid terms, it is hard to imagine that it will not have an impact on
prices. Most attention was still focused on oil because that was a
more mature market, but the effect was seen as spreading to natural
gas.
More than 200 hedge funds already play or are set to play
in energy commodities markets, and they are primed to
bring more risk capital to bear in those markets. Evidence
of their trading activities is already speculated to account
for the much hig.er crude oil prices seen in recent months,
and some analysts suggest that hedge fund activity may account for up to $8 per barrel of total price. Additional evidence of their influence has been the 55% growth in open
interest on NYMEX crude, heating oil, and gasoline contracts over the past year and the more violent and volatile
intraday trading moving during recent months. What happened in oil has spread to gas, power, and coal.155
The figure of $8 per barrel as a "hedge fund activity premium" in oil is a stunning number for mid-2004. It represents approximately 20 percent of the refinery acquisition cost in 2004 and
two-thirds of the $12 increase in refinery acquisition costs between
2002 and 2004. A study prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy
suggested a disconnect between natural gas energy futures prices and
the underlying resource costs of $2.30 per thousand cubic feet (mcf)
of natural gas production costs.1 56 This figure is equal to about 20
percent of the natural gas wellhead price in 2006 and over 50 percent
of the increase in natural gas wellhead prices between 2002 and 2006.
By mid-2006, the estimates of a speculative premium on oil had
57 risen
to $25 dollars per barrel, or about one third of the world price.1
The opportunity to straddle a variety of markets can also be
exploited by the new players. They can take positions in lightly regulated exchanges and unregulated OTC markets, directly hold physical

155 Fusaro,

supra note 153, at 3.

Office of Oil and Gas, Energy Information Administration, An Assessment
of Prices of Natural Gas Contract as a Predictor of Realized Spot Prices at the
Henry Hub, October 2005.
157 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to Put the cop Back on the Beat (June 27,
2006P)
156
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assets, and participate as large players in equity markets.' 58 Chasing
high profits in the energy sector in markets that lack transparency increases risk, which demands higher returns. "What is readily apparent
from all of this activity is that the fund community now sees the energy complex fundamentals trending to higher prices and that it offers
them an attractive sector in which to inflate sagging returns for investors. ' ' 159 This prediction of increasing profits made in October 2004
proved quite correct. The bonus pool at Goldman Sachs, one of the
key members of the "triangle of trading," has raised some eyebrows.
The bonus pool, as we've heard ad nauseam, is overflowing
with some $11 billion. Mr. Paulson, the chairman and
chief executive, alone took home 37 million, or about 800
times the median household income in the United States.
Well done. The question is whether all of this is sustainable - and, of course,
whether the bank hasn't turned into a
60
huge hedge fund. 1
By mid-year 2005, given the lack of regulation and the huge
sums of money changing hands, even the most ardent defenders of
commodity trading became a little worried.
During this spring, one gas trader was front running overnight electronic gas markets on NYMEX's Access, which
is a NYMEX vulnerability. We don't see adequate market
surveillance and enforcement from either the SEC or the
CFTC. We expect more hedge funds to blow up (some already have) in energy commodity trading and unfortunately
more phantom and wash trading[,] i.e. "market manipulation." This goes back to how traders are incented in the
first place.
It's really not necessary to create an environment in which
criminal activity may flourish again as we are in the midst
of the greatest commodity bull market for natural resources
of all time ....

Peter Fusaro & Gary Vasey, Energy Hedge Funds: Why Have They Appeared Now?, Commodities Now, Dec. 2004, at 1.
158

159 Id. at 2.
160

Andrew Ross Sorkin, Cheer to Deals that Fizzed (or Fizzled), N.Y. Times,

Jan. 1, 2006, § 3, at 1.
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We are in the ramp up stage for energy hedge funds and we
are becoming convinced that there is a real
business in a
6
"due diligence" service of these startups.' 1
By the winter of 2005-2006, prices were not only high; they
were also being described with a variety of terms including:"
a disas' 164
' 162
"out of control,"' 163 "unusual,
ter ... a bit of a Gong Show,
"wacky,' 65 "frenetic,' 66 "strange,' 67 and "a roller coaster."' 68
While these descriptions in the popular and trade press are striking,
the fact that regulators with responsibility for oversight of various
parts of the industry described pricing as "odd" and "erratic" at the
winter meeting of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners is a source of even greater concern. 169 Indeed, "the
unusual set of circumstances [has] made it particularly hard for FERC
analysts to 70
draw a clear picture of how markets are truly behaving and why."'

C. A Broader Pattern of Abuse in Energy Markets
Natural gas was not the only energy commodity subject to
abuse.
"There are regular squeezes in the Brent [oil] market .... People seem to do it in turn. It depends on who's smart
enough to move in a way nobody notices until it happens. ' 1 In a
161

SEC Coup D'Etat, Energy Hedge, June 15, 2005, at 5.

162

NYMEX Settles at New High; Cash Trading Thin, Gas Daily, Sept. 23,

2005, § 183.
163 NYMEX Retreats, But Cash Prices Keep Rising, Gas Daily, Nov. 18, 2005,
§ 223.
Harry Chernoff, Unusual Signals form the Natural Gas Markets, Energy
Pulse,
Nov.
30,
2005,
http://www.energypulse.net/centers/article/article_display.cfm?aid=l 150.
165 Jeff Beattie, Warm Winter Brings Wacky Price Pattern to Natural Gas Market, Energy Daily, Jan. 25, 2006; see also "Strange" Market Dynamics Led to Storage Gluts, Gas Daily, Feb. 14, 2006.
166 NYMEX Up 26.6 Cents as Cold Weather Returns, Gas Daily, Feb. 6, 2006.
164

167
168

"Strange" Market Dynamics, supra note 167.
Spencer Jakab, Natural Gas Rides a Roller Coaster, Wall St. J., Feb. 21,

2006, at C-5; see also NYMEX Up 26.6 Cents, supra note 166.
169 Beattie, supra note 165.
170

"Strange" Market Dynamics, supra note 165.

171

Randall Dodd & Jason Hoody, Learning Our Lessons: A Short History of
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case brought by a private party in late 2001, the practical reality was
revealed.
Tosco won a settlement claiming that Arcadia Petroleum (a
British subsidiary of the Japanese firm Mitsui) engineered
an elaborate scheme to manipulate oil prices in September
of 2001 through the use of OTC derivatives and a large
cash market position to corner the market in Brent crude
oil. As a result, the price of Brent Crude soared between
August 2 1st and September 5 th and pushed its price to a
premium over West Texas Intermediate crude oil
(WTI) ....
Dated Brent, which acts as a price markerfor many international grades, is physical crude traded on an informal
market, rather than a regulated futures exchange. This
lack of regulation poses problems for oil producers and
consumers seeking a fairprice .... A typical Brent squeeze
involves a company quietly building a strong position in
short-term swaps called contractsfor difference, or CFD 's,
for a differential not reflected in currentprices. The company then buys enough cargoes in the dated Brent market
to drive the physical crude price higher, which boosts the
CFD differential ....
The company may lose money on the physical side, but it's
more than compensatedfrom profits on its ofetting paper
position in the short-term swaps market....
These abuses persist in markets that are actually more difficult to move than natural gas markets. For example, in January 2006,
the CFTC reported a settlement in oil trading:
The CFTC said that it found that, on at least five occasions
from November 2003 to March 2004, traders for Houstonbased Shell Trading U.S. Co. and London-based Shell International Trading & Shipping Co. executed prearranged
and noncompetitive trades in crude-oil futures contracts in
violation of exchange rules. In each instance, the regulator
found, Shell traders agreed to swap a prearranged quantity
Market Manipulation and the Public Interest, Derivative Study Center: Special Policy Brief, Apr. 9, 2002, available at http://www.financialpolicy.org/DSCSPB3.htm.
172Id. (Italics in original).
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of oil-futures contracts for delivery in the same month.....
Heavy wash trading in the natural-gas market in the U.S.
earlier this decade undermined the credibility of that market. Oil-futures, however, are more liquid, making it much
more difficult for isolated trades to distort prices. In late
2003, BP PLC agreed to a record $2.5 million fine with
Nymex, settling charges of improper crude oil trading, including wash trading.
Note that the parent corporations of the two entities mentioned in these complaints are two of the largest natural gas marketers
who account for almost one-third of the gas marketed in the U.S.
The subsequent collapse in the fall of 2006 of a relatively small
hedge fund, which had accumulated contracts equal to over one-third
of national consumption for a single month in what may have been an
attempt to comer the market, suggested74that lesser actions to influence price were not out of the question. 1
On April 29, 2006, the New York Times ran a front-page article under the headline "Trading Frenzy Adds to Jump in Price of
Oil.' ' 175 The Times article opens with a brief paragraph on the conditions in the physical market but then devotes about 36 column inches
to the proposition that financial markets are adding to the price increase.
"A global economic boom, sharply higher demand, extraordinarily tight supplies and domestic instability in many
of the world's top oil-producing countries - in that environment higher oil prices were inevitable.
But crude oil is not merely a physical commodity .... It has
also become a valuable financial asset, bought and sold in
electronic exchanges by traders around the world. And
they, too, have helped push prices higher....
"Gold prices do not go up because jewelers need more
173Chip Cummins, Moving the Market: Shell Trader, Unit are Fined Over Bogus Oil Trades, Wall St. J., Jan.5, 2006, at C-3.
174
Amaranth Advisors, located at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ama-

ranthAdvisors (last visited May 24, 2007).
175 Jad Mouawad & Heather Timmons, Trading Frenzy Adds to Jump
in Price
of Oil, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 2006, at A-1.
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gold, they go up because gold is an investment," said Roger
Diwan, a partner with PFC Energy, a Washington-based
consultant. "The same has happened to oil....."
"It is the case," complained BP's chief executive, Lord
Browne, "that the price 1of
7 6 oil has gone up while nothing
has changed physically."'

Three key factors serve to drive the price spiral higher: volume, volatility and risk. The structure and availability of markets
plays a role in allowing the volumes to increase.
Changes in the way oil is traded have contributed their part
as well. On Nymex, oil contracts held mostly by hedge
funds - essentially private investment vehicles for the
wealthy and institutions, run by traders who share risk and
reward with their partners - rose above one billion barrels
this month, twice the amount held five years ago.
Beyond that, trading has also increased outside official exchanges, including swaps or over-the-counter trades conducted directly between, say, a bank and an airline....
Such trading is a 24-hour business. And more sophisticated
electronic technology allows more money to pour into oil,
quicker than ever before, from anywhere in the world. 177
The influx of new money is sustained by movements of different institutions and individuals into the market. "Everybody is
jumping into commodities and there is a log of cash chasing oil," said
Philip K. Verleger Jr., a consultant and former
senior advisor on en78
ergy policy at the Treasury Department.1
This fundamental observation had been offered a couple of
years earlier in a front page Wall Street Journal article entitled, "Oil
Brings Surge in Speculators Betting on Prices: Large Investors
Play179
ing Ongoing Rise is Increasing Demand and Price Itself:'
176 id.
177 Id.
178

id.

179Gregory Zuckerman & Hinny Sender, Oil Brings in Speculators Betting on
Prices - Large Investors Playing Ongoing Rise is Increasing Demand and Price Itself, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 2004, at. A-1.
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Oil has become a speculator's paradise. Surging energy
prices have attracted a horde of investors - and their feverish betting on rising prices has itself contributed to the
climb.
These investors have driven up volume on commodities'
exchanges and prompted a large push among Wall Street
banks and brokerage firms .... to beef up energy-trading
capabilities. As the action has picked up in the past year,
those profiting include large, well-known hedge funds, an
emerging group of high-rollers, as well as descendants of
once-highflying energy-trading shops such as Enron
18
Corp. N
In the same article in 2004, Allan Greenspan offered precisely
this view of what had begun to happen in the financial markets.
"The marked rise in the net long positions of noncommercial investors in oil futures and options since May 2003 has
increased net claims on an already diminished global level
of commercial crude and product inventories," said Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan18in
June of this year.
1
Oil prices accordingly have surged."'
The notion is that the continual influx of money represents too
much money chasing too few goods. Exhibit 111-2, shows the dramatic increase in trading associated with energy commodities.

80

1

Id.

181 Id..
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Exhibit 111-2: Commodity Trading Of Non-Financial Instruments
(Average Month-end Open Interest)
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Source: Commodity Future Trading Commission, Annual Reports:
Futures Statistics by Major Commodity Group.
The increase in Exhibit 111-2 is the volume of contracts. The
value of contracts also increased dramatically. Combined, the increase in total value was almost tenfold. Put another way, the value
of trading increased about $7 billion per month, every month for
three years.
Even this comparison significantly underestimates the magnitude of the increase in commodity market activity in energies. The
dollar value of these energy futures contracts has increased much
more rapidly than for other commodities. Moreover, while the quantity of off-exchange (or over-the-counter) trading in agricultural derivatives is not significant, that for energy derivatives is.
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D. Efforts to Understand and Correct the Problem have Failed
There are strands in the technical literature, particularly on
energy, which support a number of propositions that lie at the core of
the concern about the recent behavior of the natural gas market.
These markets are inefficient, allowing supranormal tradingsprofits. 182 Increases in volatility lead to higher risk premiums.' 8 Increased volatility results in lower production as producers exercise
their option to hold assets in the ground. 184 Increases in volatility
drive spot prices farther above futures prices.185 The important point
here is that one cannot assume that the market is "working" just because it is a market. There are structural conditions that may impose
inefficient and unnecessary costs on consumers, exploitation of tight
markets, and opportunities for abuse.
This basic proposition is true of the broader literature on financial markets. There are strands in this literature that identify potential and actual abusive practices. Many of these are directly relevant to the energy market, including: manipulation facilitated by
large positions,' lack of transparency,' 87 structural advantages enjoyed by large traders,' 88 the exercise of market power, 189 insider

William E. Shambora & Rosemary Rossier, Are There Exploitable Inefficiencies in the Futures Market for Oil, Energy Econ. (forthcoming).
183 Robert H. Litzenberger & Nir Rabinowitz, Backwardation in Oil Futures
Markets: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 5 J. Fin. 1538 (1995).
184 Id. at 1537; Robert S. Pyndyck, The Dynamics of Commodity Spot and Futures Markets: A Primer, Energy J., June 1, 2001, at 1.
185Litzenberger and Rabinowitz, supra note 185, at 1537.
182

Dutt & Harris, supranote 134, at 947. (Containing a very recent reference.
Reviews of broader literature can also be found in the article.).
187 See generally, F. Drudi & M. Massa, Price Manipulation in Parallel Markets with Different Transparency, 78 J. Bus. 1625 (2005); M. Angeles de Frutos &
Carolina Manzano; Trade Disclosure and Price Dispersion, 8 J. Fin. Markets 18
186

(2005).
188 Robert Jarrow & Phillip Protter, Large Traders, Hidden Arbitrage, and

Complete Markets, 29 J. Banking & Fin.2803 (2005).
189 See generally, Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo Montero, Forward Trading and
Collusion in Oligopoly, 131 J. Econ. Theory 212 (2006); Matti Liski & Juan-Pablo
Montero, Market Power in a Storable-Good Market: Theory and Applications to
Carbon and Sulfur Trading, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

(2005) (Containing a very recent reference. Reviews of broader literature can also
be found in the article.).
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91
trading'
and self-dealing,'
practices
193 that accelerate market
trends,' 92 perhaps
causing themtrading
to overshoot.

The academic literature focuses on fairly sophisticated
transactions.
Cash-settled derivative contracts are susceptible to manipulation. Manipulative traders may profit by taking large positions in the contract and manipulating the underlying cash
settlement price. Whether such manipulations would be
profitable depends on whether the cost of manipulating
prices in the underlying markets are 194
less than the benefits
settlements.
cash
favorable
making
of
The citation above comes from an article that makes the case
that position limits are necessary in these markets on the basis of very
sophisticated situations in which surveillance will be a challenge.
These manipulations rest on taking sophisticated contrary positions in
different markets. Actions that appear as losses in one market are actually more than compensated by gains in another market. The complex types of manipulation that this sophisticated analysis identifies
are different from the more blatant types of manipulation that attract
headlines. The support for limits stems from the fact that oversight
alone cannot detect abusive trading practices. The complex theory is
as follows:
If manipulations were easily identified, increasing surveillance efforts would be sufficient to reduce manipulations
by increasing the probability of detection and subsequent
prosecution with regard to the narrow-based derivative contracts. Successful prosecution of manipulation, however, is
difficult, because prosecutors must prove manipulative in190 Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary
Comparative Evidence, 7 Am.L. & Econ. Rev. 1446 (2005) (Containing a very recent reference. Reviews of broader literature can be found in the article).
191 David E.M. Sappington & Burcin Unel, Privately-Negotiated Input Prices,

27 J.Reg. Econ.263 (2005).
192 See generally, Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Predatory
Trading, 60 J. Fin. 1825 (2005).
193 Matthew Pritsker, Large Investors: Implications for Equilibrium Asset Returns, Shock Absorption, and Liquidity, Finance and Economics Discussion Series,
Federal Reserve Board (2005).
194 Dutt & Harris, supra note 134,
at 947.
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tent (scienter). Manipulators may avoid liability by offering plausible alternative
explanations for their trading in the
95
underlying securities.'
Position limits directly limit manipulation by limiting the
size of derivative positions that would benefit from manipulative practices. Position limits can potentially improve economic efficiency by reducing manipulation in a
less costly manner than surveillance
alone. However, they
96
can be set too high or too low. 1
Unregulated markets make the problem particularly acute.
With huge sums being traded in these unregulated markets, regulators
do not know what is going on. It is also the case that trading, even
without manipulation, can have negative effects on the market and
specific types of players therein.
Even when the settlements of cash-settled contracts are not
purposefully manipulated, the settlement mechanism may
increase underlying volatility when hedgers unwind their
hedges if they have no incentive to control their trading
costs. This generally is the case when hedgers trade out of
their positions at the same prices that determine the final
cash settlement price. The resulting price uncertainty may
reduce trading by risk-averse traders and thus produce
deadweight losses. 197
The FERC 198 and the CFTC 19 9 both issued reports concluding
that there has been no market manipulation, while the GAO is reserving judgment. 20 0 These studies have not laid the concerns to rest for a
195

Id. at 948.

106 Id. at
197 Id.

948-949.

at 947..

198 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, High Natural Gas Prices: The Ba-

sics, February 1, 2006.
99 Michael S. Haigh, Jana Hranaiova & James A. Overdahl, Price Dynamics,
Price Discovery and Large Futures Trader Interactions in the Energy Complex,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Apr. 28, 2005); see also A Review of
Recent Hedge Fund Participation in NYMEX Natural Gas and Crude Oil Futures
Markets, New York Mercantile Exchange (March 1, 2005).
200 GAO Hints at Post-Katrina Price Tampering, Gas Daily, Feb. 14, 2006, at 1
(reflecting the statement that "other factors - such as market manipulation - may
also have affected wholesale prices."); see also Natural Gas: Factors Affecting
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number of reasons.
Studies by the CFTC and the GAO "can't assure the public
that the over-the-counter market isn't being manipulated., 20 1 Even
where the trading is regulated and regulators have taken a peak at
what is going on, questions persist. "Studies by the New York Mercantile Exchange and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
have disputed the notion that hedge funds are having undue influence
on pricing or volatility... [M]any traders have scoffed at the studies,
saying
' ' ° that they focused only on certain months, missing price runups.

*

The studies do not deal with a period in which there
was a rapid run up in prices. It does appear that if you
study the wrong months in the wrong markets, you
will not learn very much.2 °3

*

The Commission does not have the data necessary to
uncover many of the effects that are a concern.

*

Blatant manipulation is not the only issue; the concern
is a much broader range of behaviors and structural effects.

*

The claim that the market is efficient is refuted by the
detailed academic studies. The opinion about the effi20 4
ciency of the natural gas market varies across time.

*

The assertion that the market provides liquidity and
price discovery is in dispute. Out beyond a couple of
months there is very little liquidity on the exchanges
subject to CFTC jurisdiction.

Prices and Potential Impact on Consumers, Testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Government
Affairs, U.S. Senate, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Jim Wells, Director Natural
Resources and Environment) (focusing on tight physical markets).
201 Barrionuevo, supra note 128, at 3 (quoting Randall Dodd, director of the
Financial Policy Forum).
202 id.
203 Rocio Uria & Jeffrey Williams, The "Supply-of-Storage" for Natural Gas in

California, University of California Energy Institute (Sept. 2005).
204 See John H. Herbert, The Relation of Monthly Spot to Futures Prices of
Natural Gas, Energy, 18: 1993 Arthur De Vany & W David Walls, The Law of One
Price in a Network: Arbitrage and Price Dynamics in Natural Gas City Gate Markets, 36 J. Regional Sci. 555, (1996).
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Other, more recent studies cast further doubt on these conclusions.20 5

The FERC has also issued rules implementing the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 that change its market monitoring procedures and
implement new powers granted in the Act. 206 It has entered into a
vague memorandum of understanding about sharing information. 207
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that a lot more than manipulation is at issue in the natural gas price spiral and suggests that much
more needs to be done. Both the FERC and the CFTC are looking
for a very narrow range of manipulative behaviors with a very narrow
telescope. Unlike other physical commodities, a vast amount of trading of natural gas goes on in the OTC markets that are hidden from
the view and are beyond the authority of these agencies. The indices
that are based on this unregulated market activity have been unreliable and remain subject to doubt.
In the case of regulated activities, the changes at the FERC
replicate the weaknesses of the CFTC approach by adopting its definitions and case law. It may be illegal to contrive to manipulate markets and there are new fines if you are caught doing so, but the FERC
is going to have great difficulty proving manipulation when prices are
"moved." It is precisely for this reason that the CFTC and the exchanges subject to its jurisdiction do more than rely on narrowly defined manipulation statutes to prevent abuse.
As noted above, exchanges adopt additional measures to limit
the ability to move prices - like position limits and price change limits. Unfortunately, for natural gas, these remain far too lax. FERC
has no authority to implement effective trading limits and the CFTC
has chosen not to do so.
Efforts to ensure the accuracy of prices in the over-thecounter market have been equally unsatisfying. The indices on which
many contracts rely are privately compiled reports of transactions.
This reporting was entirely voluntary and unaudited. Misreporting
was uncovered and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission con205

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, supra note 157; see Robert J.

Shapiro and Nam D. Pham, An Analysis of Spot and Futures Prices for Natural
Gas: The Roles of Economic Fundamental, Market Structure, Speculation and Manipulation (August, 2006).
206 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, Order No. 670, Docket No. RM06-3-000, Jan. 19, 2006.
207 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
Regarding Information Sharing and Treatment of Proprietary Trading and Other
Information (Oct. 12, 2005).
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sidered reform. It chose to suggest a code of conduct. Reporting remains voluntary and unaudited. Those reporting must merely attest
to the veracity of the reported transactions they choose to report.
When the spotlight was first turned on the construction of the
survey, many firms ceased reporting their transactions. Now that the
process has been reformed, the amount of reporting remains extremely low (see Exhibit 111-3). The quantity of reported transactions
is an extremely small fraction of the total gas consumed in the country - one to two percent. While there are other indices and one need
not assume that gas should be transacted in this cash market to be
consumed, the fact that such a small quantity of gas plays such an
important role in price setting is a concern. This is particularly the
case where the reported transactions are self-selected.
Exhibit 111-3: Gas Daily Henry Hub Volume
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IV. Deregulatory Ineptitude in Electricity2. 8
In the previous section we have seen that the fits of wild trading in natural gas were wrapped around the California electricity crisis. There were direct and indirect links, not the least of which was
that the leading trader in first natural gas crisis, Enron, was also a key
figure in California electricity deregulation. Recounting the plight of
American energy consumers would not be complete without some
mention of electricity and California. My purpose here is to highlight
the central themes of this paper, strategic behavior and market power
built on weak market fundamentals.
For almost a year from mid-2000 to mid-2001, as California
electricity prices skyrocketed and the lights flickered, the FERC insisted that this was just the market working and nothing was wrong,
blaming market forces of supply and demand.20 9 Ironically on the
very day that the FERC reinstituted price caps on the California Market in June of 2001, the Department of Energy came out with a study
that declared that any limit on prices would hurt California.21 ° Over
five years later, a mountain of evidence suggests that the claims by
both Federal agencies were dead wrong. There was massive manipulation of the California market2 11 and price caps quieted the market.

208

This section draws on Mark Cooper, Motion to Intervene and Request for

Rehearing of The Consumer Federation of America, Arizona Consumers Council,
CALPRG, Colorado PIRG, Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of California,
Consumer Fraud Watch, Democratic Process Center, Illinois PIRG, Mass PIRG,
Massachusetts Consumers' Coalition, Michigan Consumer Federation, New York
PIRG, Pennsylvania Citizens Consumer Council, Utility Consumers Action Network, and Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket Nos. EL0O-95-012, ELO0-98-000, Rt 01-85-000, ELOI-68-000,
2001. Mark Cooper, Back to Basics in Analyzing the Failure of Electricity Restructuring: Accepting the Limits of Markets, presented at Energy Markets in Turmoil,
Institute for Regulatory Policy Studies, Illinois State University, May 17, 2001;
Mark Cooper, Recognizing Limits of Market, Rediscovering Public Interest in
Utilities, in Robert E. Willett, ED. Natural Gas and Electric Power Industry Analysis (2003)
209 See Cooper, Motion to intervene, supra note 208, for a general critique of
FERC's failure to act.
210 U.S. DOE, Office of Economic, Electricity and Natural Gas Analysis, The
Impact of Wholesale Electricity Price Controls on California Summer Reliability
(Washington, June 2001).211 Attorney General Bill Lockyear, Attorney General's Energy White Paper: A
Law Enforcement Perspective on the California Energy Crisis: Recommendations
for Improving Enforcement and Protecting Consumers in Deregulated Energy Markets, April 2004, available at http://ag.ca.gov/publications/energywhitepaper.pdf.
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A. Profit Motivation Reduces Supply
The California energy crisis has been picked over numerous
times. Here, this article focuses on the key themes of strategic behavior and market power that integrate into the earlier analysis. Faced
with the prospect of deregulation, utilities restricted their investment. 212 Not only did utilities refuse to build power plants, they actively prevented as much as 4,000 megawatts of long-term resources
from entering the system and failed to provide an equal amount of
short term resources. 213 Utilities cut back on their spending on conservation, which led to a shortfall in demand reduction of a couple
thousand megawatts. In defense of their distribution assets, they also
fought steadfastly against distributed generation, which could have
brought substantial capacity on line in addition to relieving demands
on transmission assets. 214 Citing the impending competitive market,
utilities refused to buy about a thousand megawatts of renewable energy that they were supposed to. Utilities failed to produce spot and
interruptible contracts for large quantities of additional capacity to

which they were committed.2
When they were given the opportunity to enter into long-term contracts, they failed to fully avail them212

In addition to findings on market power cited above, see Bohn, et. al., Mar-

ket Monitoring Committee of the California Power Exchange, Report on Market
Issues in the California Power Exchange Energy Markets (Aug. 17, 1998) and Energy Information Administration, Horizontal Market Power in Restructured Electricity Markets (Mar. 2000).
213 The key elements of this scenario were laid out in Michael Kahn & Loretta
Lynch, California's Electricity Options and Challenges (August, 2000). An interesting perspective on perceptions about the crisis that tracks many of the arguments
made below can be found in "Roundtable Dialogue on California Energy Crisis,"
Sacramento Bee (Dec. 24, 2000). William Marcus & Jan Hamrin, How We Got
into the California Energy Crisis, (2001) [hereinafter Marcus, Crisis] at 2-3 (providing specific estimates of the size of each of the factors, as do Harvey Harvey,
Hal et al., "California and the Energy Crisis: Diagnosis and Cure," Energy Foundation, March 8, 2001, at 1..
214 See Marcus, Crisis, supra note 213; see also Brent R. Alderfer, Monika M.
Eldridge, & Thomas J. Starrs, Making Connections: Case Studies of Interconnection Barriers and the Impact of Distributed Power Projects, National Renewable
Energy Laborabory 5 (2000), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy00osti/28053.pdf.. The
Department of Energy documented the difficulties that utilities created for the expansion of supply through distributed generation
215 Marcus, Crisis, supra note 213 (providing the following figures: for long
term resources 1400 MW renewables and cogeneration, 2000 MW of efficiency;
for short term resources 2300 MW of uncontracted spot capacity and 2500 MW of
bogus interruptible contracts. The California Energy Commission put distributed
generation as high as 20 percent, or as much as 10,000 MW, by 2010.
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selves of the hedging opportunities to mitigate the exposure to price
216
run-ups.
The independent power producers also did not build new
power plants. Instead, they bought the existing ones. They immediOn any
ately began running plants less than the previous owners.
given day during the price spikes these plants were producing between 2000 and 6000 megawatts less than their historic average.218
The same independent generators also opposed long-term contracts,
which would have kept utilities out of the volatile spot market.
The disappearance of these assets was part of a pattern of resource denial that has the effect of driving up the price of electricity. 2 19 This profit driven denial of resources equal to between 10 and
20 percent of peak demand had a substantial impact on price and performance. 220 As a result, the public welfare was placed at the mercy

Frank Wolak, et al. An Analysis of the June 2000 Price Spike in California
ISO's Energy and Ancillary Service Market. Market Surveillance Committee of the
California ISO. September 6, 2000, at 14; Alfred E. Kahn, et. al., Pricing in the
California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing, California Power Exchange, Jan. 23, 2001,
www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/kahn-kramton-porter-tabors-blue-ribbonpanel-report-to-calpx.pdf (also recognizing that utilities did not take these opportunities, but excusing it by suggesting they did not trust regulators).
217 Puller, Steven L., "Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated
216

Electricity Market," (University of California Energy Institute, Program on Workable Energy Regulation, November 2000). (showing an immediate reduction in utilization after deregulation and divestiture.)
218 Kenneth Rose, The California Restructuring Meltdown and the Fallout in
Other States, National Conference of State Legislature, AFI/ASI Joint Winter
Meeting, AFI Energy and Transportation Committee (Dec. 13, 2000) [hereinafter
Other States] (noting how the summer of 1999 experienced price spikes), at 34
(showing an increase in unplanned outages between 1999 and 2000 of about 1,000
MW in June, 1,600 MW in July, and 2,500 MW in August); Marcus, Crisis, supra
note 213, at 7 ("Forced outage rates for California natural gas plants over the past
five years have gone from the traditional 5-10 percent per year outage rate to an average of almost 50 percent.").
219 Severin Borenstein, et. al., Diagnosing Market Power in California's Restructured Electricity Market University of California Energy Institute (Aug. 2000),
www.ucei.berkeley.edu/.
220 Marcus, Crisis, supra note 213; William B. Marcus & Greg Russzon, Cost
Curve Analysis of the California Power Markets, (Sacramento: JBS Energy, Inc.,
2000) (calling it a summer 2000 shift). I calculate that the graphs show that the
jump in gas prices runs the cost from 8.3 cents per kWh to 16.5 cents at 40,000
MW without the summer shift and 24 cents with the summer shift. At 45,000 MW,
the price is 78 cents per kWh and at 35,000 MW, it is 11.4 cents. Adding 5,000 to
10,000 MW to the system has a huge benefit in relieving price pressures.).
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of the weather, the ability of producers to game the market and the
inability of regulators to prevent that gaming.
B. Regulatory Irresponsibility That Harms The Public
For its part, the FERC prematurely deregulated price over the
objection of many in California. In fact, the FERC fought California
authorities to assert control over the Independent System Operator
(ISO) and then deregulated the price of energy in the California
wholesale market, even though its market analysis was fundamentally
flawed. This enabled private interests to take advantage of the bad
situation that they had helped to create. The FERC failed to reasonably analyze the market before it deregulated. It treated the state as
one big market, when it is evident that there are distinct and separate
22
north-south markets because of a transmission capacity constraint. '
It failed to identify load pockets that would be constrained at peak
222
times.
It deregulated ancillary services, even though it was told
market power existed in these markets. 223 It accepted on faith that
"must run" plants would mitiate market power, without any concrete
plan to ensure that they did.
More generally, the FERC rubber stamped industry rules on
transmission capacity availability and transmission load relief that
simply cannot ensure open transmission networks or prevent manipulation of transmission capacity availability.2 25 The FERC also pur-

Severin Borenstein, et. al.., The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Market, Rand Jour. Econ 318 (2000); Lisa G
Dowden, et. al., Market Power: Will We Know it When We See It?: The California
Experience, American Public Power Association (Dec. 2000); Marcus, Crisis, supra note 213.
222 James A. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, Regulation and the Leverage of Local Market Power in California's Electricity Market (University of California,
Berkeley,
Working
Paper
No.
CPC00- 13),
available
at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article+ 101 3&context=-iber/cpc.
223 Dowden, et. al., supra note 221; Marcus, Crisis, supra note 213.
221

224

Dowden, et. al., supra note 221; Marcus, Crisis, supra note 213.

225

Richard D. Tabors & Luis Paz Galindo, Transmission Pricing in PJM: Al-

lowing the Economics of the Market to Work (May 12, 1999). Narasimha Roe &
Richard D. Tabors, Transmission Markets: Stretching the Rules for Fun and Profit
(TCA Working Paper, No. 327-0400). The importance of transmission is underscored in Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft. Consumer Federation of America, "Request for Reconsideration," Regional Transmission Organizations, United States of
America, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. RM99-2-000; Order
No. 2000, Session (Jan. 20, 1999)..
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sued a remarkably permissive merger policy. 22 6 As a result, national
and regional markets have become much more concentrated.227
The FERC refused to responsibly police the markets it irresponsibly deregulated.
It defended the secrecy of spot market bidding, which appears to have the effect of allowin~ztight oligopolies of
bidders to play their games behind closed doors. 9 It refused to requisition and study bidding records for abusive patterns after the first
price spikes in 1998, 23 and the second price spikes in 1999,231 which

emboldened strategic bidders for the really big killing of 2000.
The FERC approved rates without subjecting them to refund,
so that market manipulators know they will never have to disgorge
their ill-gotten gains. 2 32 It even rushed in to allow a hasty reorganization of one of the California utilities to shield its assets from its creditors.233 As the only dissenting Commissioner put it, if the FERC had
exercised more responsibility earlier, "capping spot market prices at
variable operating costs plus a capacity adder ...there is reason
to
dire straits now." 234

believe that applicants would not be in such
226

Mark Cooper, Mergers and Open Access to Transmission in the Restructuring Electric Industry: Analytic Tools, Empirical Evidence and Policies to Build Effective
Market
Structures
(Apr.
2000),
http://www.consumerfed.org/
pdfs/electmkt.pdf.
227 The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 1999: Mergers and
Other Corporate Combinations , Energy Information Administration, (Dec. 1999),
http://tonto.eia.doe/gov/FTPROOT/electricity/056299.pdf.
228 Dowden, et. al., supra note 221 (recounting the evidence presented to
FERC on market power and FERC's seeming inaction); Mark Cooper, Electricity
Restructuring and the Price Spikes of 1998: A Need for More Vigorous Efforts to
Protect Consumers (June 21, 1999). (hereafter, Spikes) discusses the failure of
FERC to react vigorously to complaints of market power in response to the 1998
price spikes.
229 Dowden et. al., supra note 221.
230

Cooper, Spikes, supra, note 228.

231

A frustrated FERC staff member wrote a blistering critique of FERC's un-

willingness to investigate transaction data in 1998 and 1999, just prior to the onset
of the big problems in the California market in 2000. See Open Memorandum
From: Ron Rattey,
OMTR, To:
FERC
Staff (June
2,
2000),
http://www.mresearch.com/pdfs.202.pdf.
232 Dowden, et. al., supra 221.
233

Order Authorizing Disposition of Jurisdictional Facilities, PGE National

Energy Group,
Inc. (Jan.
12,
2001),
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/
search/results.asp.
234 Commissioner Massey, dissenting, Order Authorizing Disposition of Jurisdictional

Facilities,

PGE National

Energy Group,

Inc. (Jan.

12,

2001),
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Consider the following example based on the Landes and
Posner discussion and the empirical evidence from California. Assume a generator with a 10 percent market share in a market with a
demand elasticity of .03 and a supply elasticity of .2. Assume the rest
of the market is a "competitive fringe," which could expand its output
subject to the elasticity. The Lerner Index would be .48; prices
would be marked up 48 percent above costs, a very substantial markup.
The 10 percent market share in the example approximates the
size of the smaller out-of-state generators who abused their market
power in California. In fact, this example underestimates the potential for the exercise of market power since the state is not one big
market and the inability of some utility plants, which were run at all
times regardless of price (must run plants), to expand output in response to market needs. 235 Thus, the "market" is frequently defined
as only the fossil generators, and the competitive fringe could be considered only the fossil generators. Either the numerator of the Landes
and Posner formula would be twice as large or the denominator
would be half as large. Either way, the Lerner index would be substantially larger - about twice the size. This is roughly what we observe in the real world.236
Interestingly, we can find a similar scenario simultaneously
unfolding in natural gas. The CPUC let the electric utilities out of
natural gas storage requirements because they are noncore customers,
237 which is an absurd misdefinition of core and noncore that exacerbated the problem. 238 Large corporate consumers got out from under
their obligations to keep fuel in storage, including electric utilities,
and the obligation to have alternative fuel capacity since all these
contingencies cost too much in a competitive market. 239 Simultaneously, utilities fought against increasing pipeline capacity into the
state. Firm transmission rights and gas brokering functions were
http://www.caiso.com/docs/2000/12/01/2000120116120227219ex.html (last visited
May 24, 2007).
235 Dowden, McDiarmid, and Huang, supra note 221; Marcus, supra note 213..
236

Eric Hildebrandt, Impacts of Market Power in California's Wholesale En-

ergy Market: More Detailed Analysis Based on Individual Seller Schedules and
Transactions in the ISO and PX Markets, Department of Market Analysis, California ISO (Apr. 2001); at 8 (finding mark-ups of 30 percent using the extreme assumptions of spot gas and NOx. Using more realistic assumptions would increase
the estimate.).
237 Wolak, et. al., supra note 216.
238

Marcus, Crisis, supra note 214.

239

Marcus, Crisis, supra note 214.
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transferred to unregulated affiliates, who have every interest in charging the utility sister companies the highest price possible. The FERC
deregulated a capacity constrained market with storage at unprecedentedly low levels.
Things would have been bad no matter what the California
market institutions looked like, but the institutions certainly did not
help matters and actually made them worse in a number of ways.
The California Independent System Operator (CAL-ISO) adopted a
one- price auction, which pays the highest price to everyone in an
240

Alfred Kahn, et al. supra note 216, argue, based primarily on experimental

results, that the bidding system does not matter much, compared to the problems of
market power, tight supplies and inelastic demand and given the ability of those
with market power to adapt their bidding strategies to any system. To the extent
that the purpose is to prevent attention from being directed away from the important issues, this is a useful analysis, but the arguments miss the fundamental problem identified by other analysts and the victims of the one-price system. The critics
of the one-price system focus on the massive economic rents and the lottery nature
of the one price system, which exposes a few very high price offers to little risk, a
bidding strategy which is consistent with the backward bending supply curve (see
the sources cited at notes 12 and 13 in Alfred Kahn, et al., supra note 216).
McDiarmid, Dowden, and Davidson, A Modest Proposal: Revoke the Nobel
Price? Recognize the Limitations of Theory? Or Grant a License to Steal?, Electricity J., January/February 2001, summarizes the lottery nature of this type of auction
as follows:
'I know that a simple bidding strategy of bidding very high on the last few
MW will be extremely profitable for everyone, including me, if I have enough MW
already running at the time, and so I will follow that strategy and I expect anyone
else in the business to have enough brains to see the same advantage."
They describe the huge rents as follows:
the cost difference from a market-clearing price of $75 or one of $1,075 is $50
million per hour, or $500 million per 10-hour peak period. If the bidding behavior
of one of the last few suppliers were rational then, the failure of a 100 MW unit to
be dispatched would mean that the last supplier would lose $75,000 (gross revenue,
which would translate into significantly less on lost profits after reduction of the
out-of-pocket costs) for a 10-hour period; but if that supplier had 4,000 MW already in the market dispatched based on bids that would be rational for the secondprice theory, the additional amount that it would gain for the output of those units
already running if a market-clearing pride at the $1,075 level were established
would be $4 million per hour, or $40, million for the 10-hour period. Id.at 16; see
also,
"Roundtable Dialogue," supra note 240. (noting how participants clearly care a
great deal about the average price and believe that the very high rents available on
all sales at peak times has dissuaded sellers from offering reasonable prices for
longer terms). Similarly, Florida Municipal Electric Association, which represents
consumers, show substantial rents. See Energy 2020 Study Commission Wholesale
Deregulation Proposal Will Raise Electric Rates and Maximize Profits of Private
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industry that is just dripping with scarcity (ground) rents.2 4 1 It failed
to impose a reserve requirement.2 42 Different rules between the PX
and the ISO resulted in considerable underscheduling and drove up
prices. 24" 3 The Market Surveillance Committee immediately and repeatedly found market power in its general studies, 244 but the ISO
never sought to discipline those responsible.24 5
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) adopted
a prohibition on long-term contracts, which forced utilities into spot
markets. 246 The ISO suggests that a large part of the responsibility
for the failure of the demand side to respond 24
in7 the short and long
term rests with the CPUC and or the legislature.
The manner in which California escaped from the clutches of
Utility Shareholders. Woychik does not accept this point of view. "Testimony of
Eric Charles Woychik, on behalf of TURN and UCAN, San Diego Gas & Electric,
et al., Docket No. ELO0-95-000, November 22, 2000 (hereafter Turn).
241 Rosen, Richard, Freyr Sverrisson and John Stutz, Can Electric Utility Restructuring Meet the Challenges it Has Created (Tellus Institute, November 2000).
stress the importance of rents in the industry..
242 Wolak, supra note 216; TURN, supra note 241,
stresses this problem
243 Wolak, supra note 216.
244

See Market Surveillance Committee, Analysis of Order Proposing Reme-

dies for California Wholesale Electric Markets, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
(Dec.
4,
2000),
http://www.caiso.com/docs/2000/12/01/
2000120116120227219ex.html; see also Wolak, supra note 216; Bushnell, supra
note 222; Borenstein, supra note 219; Bohn, supra note 212.
245Department of Market Analysis, Report on Real Time Supply Costs Above
Single Price Auction Threshold: December 8, 2000 - January 31, 2001, (Feb.28,
2001) (finally asking for refunds of over $.5 billion of unjust and unreasonable
charges).
246 The ISO responded to selected portions of Kahn and Lynch, supra note 213,
as noted in California Energy Markets, "Priorities, August 21, 2000; Wolak, supra
note 216; TURN, supra note 240, questions the importance of the lack of long term
contracts; see also Scott M. Harvey & William Hogan, California Electricity Prices
and Forward Market Hedging (Oct. 17, 2000), http//ksghome.harvard.edu/
-whogan/mschedge 101 7.pdf.
247 ISO Response, supra note 246, at 5.
Indeed, planners of deregulation recognized that much of the success of the
markets depend on work to be implemented and/or regulated by state policymakers.
This work included development of demand responsiveness products, implementation of hedging instruments for entities that serve load, development of real time
rates and installation of real time meters, promotion of consumer education on issues of price responsiveness and conservation, and facilitation of review of transmission lines and/or substations at critical junctions in the transmission system.
Most of this work remains to be done.
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manipulators is instructive. Just as it took a powerful combination of
events to create the storm, it took a combination to break up its eye.
The key factor was a combination of good management, responsible
exercise of authority, and good luck that undermined the ability of the
merchant generators to abuse their market power.
California took the state out of the spot market. In the colorful
language that has developed in the electricity literature of spot markets, it drained the (power) pool. 24 8 It signed more long-term contracts than anticipated. 249 The state brought other source of electricity on line more quickly than expected, including qualifying facilities
and generators that had been restricted by environmental constraints. 2 50 These generally small electricity producers were important
because they are likely not as able to game the market as the large
The •251
combination of a public-spirited
merchant generators •tend to.
•
conservation campaign and a recession reduced demand.
With weak demand and a "flood" of supply, the state created
demand uncertainty for the merchant-generators. Uncertainty is critically necessary to make bidders behave honestly in these markets,
because it undermines the ability of merchant generators to withhold
capacity or demand high prices that drive the spot market to higher
levels. 23 2 Thus, much as the deep recession of 2002 was the key to
driving margins and gas prices down to historical levels, so too it was
the massive shift in supply-demand balance that alleviated the pressures on California.
The FERC finally accepted some responsibility by sending a
signal that there might actually be negative consequences for the
abuse of market power. 253 It imposed some price controls and
248

Richard Green, Draining the Pool: The Reform of Electricity Trading in

England and Wales, Energy Journal, 2000; Michael H.Rothkopf, Control of Market
Power in Electricity Auctions, January 13, 2001.
249 Between April and June, 2001, the state added approximately 1,200 MW to
its long term contract portfolio (see "California Agency's Power Costs to Drop
Sharply," Energy Daily, June 13, 2001).
250 Cooper, Recognizing, supra note 208, at 445-447.
251

Rene Sanchez, California Residents Answer State's Call to Cut Power Use,

Wash. Post, June 5, 2001 (discussing how conservation, adjusted for weather, has
been put at 5 to 10 percent); Anjali Sheffrin, Market Analysis Report for May
2001, California ISO (June 15, 2001) (noting that the reduction in peak use is between 2,000 and 4,000 MW).
252 Summing up the "unexpected" shift in the supply demand balance we find
7,000 MW more resources available in a system that typically peaks at around
48,000 MW.
253
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 95 F.E.R.C. 61115 (2001); San Diego Gas &
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opened an investigation into past overcharges. It created an obligation to sell electricity, shifting the responsibility for offering power
into the market onto the generators, and gave the ISO more authority
to enforce this obligation. It banned the practice of megawatt laundering, which transferred ownership of electricity to out-of-state brokers who would then sell the power back into the state at inflated
prices. It got serious about tackling the abuse of market power in the
natural gas transportation market. 2 4 The contract that El Paso Corporation used to control a large part of natural gas pipeline capacity
coming into the state expired. 5
Luck helped too. The weather was cool in the summer.
C. The Incredible Shrinking Benefits of Restructuring and
Deregulation
California may be an extreme example of the failure of restructuring, but it is not unique. 256 Empirical studies show that
strong economies are achieved by coordinating electricity supply and
demand.257 Before restructuring, the electricity industry was a reaElec. Co., 94 F.E.R.C. 61245 (2001); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 F.E.R.C.
61294 (2000).
254 Jeff Beattie, FERC Judge Takes Swing at El Paso on California Gas Market
Manipulation, Energy Daily, Aug. 7, 2001; Jeff Beattie, FERC to Investigate Enron
California Pipeline Deals, Energy Daily, July 26, 2001
255 Richard, A. Opel, California Gets a Reprieve as Natural Gas Prices Drop,
N.Y. Times, June 11, 2001, at C2.
256 In addition to the price spikes of 1998, see Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Staff Report, The Causes of the Pricing Abnormalities in the Midwest
During June 1998 (Sept. 22, 1998) [hereinafter FERC Staff Report]; Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio Report, Ohio's Electric Market (June 22-26, 1998); Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio, What Happened and Why: A Report to the Ohio
General Assembly (1998); Kenneth Rose, The California Electric Meltdown, presentation to the NRRI Board of Directors Meeting (Sept. 14, 2000) [hereinafter,
Rose, Meltdown]; Joseph Bowring et. al., Monitoring the PJM Market: Summer
1999, UCEI Power Conference (Mar. 17, 2000) and supply outages (Department of
Energy, Interim Report of the U.S. Department of Energy's Power Outage Supply
Study Team, (Washington, January 1999); and the summer of 2000 also exhibited
sharp run ups in New York and New England (Rose, Meltdown)...
257 Gegaux, Douglas and Kenneth Nowotny, "Competition and the Electric
Utility Industry," Yale Journal on Regulation, 10 no. 63, 1997; Gilsdorf, Keith,
"Testing for Subadditivity of Vertically-Integrated Electric Utilities," Southern
Economic Journal, 18 no. 12 (1995): Henderson, J. Stephen, "Cost Estimation for
Vertically Integrated Firms: the Cost of Electricity," in M. A. Crew (Ed.), Analyzing the Impact of Regulatory Change in Public Utilities (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1985); Hirst, Erick and Brenda Kirby, "Dynamic Scheduling: The Forgotten Issue," Public Utilities Fortnightly, April 15, 1997; Kaserman, David L. and
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sonably258well-run, complex, integrated network that was under some
stress. Creation of markets for electricity services leads to a huge
growth in the number of transactions conducted every day and creates
heavy administrative requirements. An entity that once maintained
real-time balance as an insulated operation that could oversee its own
supply, demand, and delivery, must now contract to achieve real-time

balance simultaneously in five, six, or seven different markets over
broad geographic areas. 25 9 This has proven a daunting task 2 60 that
consumes substantial resources.261
When the debate over restructuring of electric utilities began,
proponents made a number of claims predicting that restructuring and
deregulation of the retail electric market would bring both price and
262
service benefits to consumers.
Projected price reductions were
John W. Mayo, "The Measurement of Vertical Economies and the Efficient Structure of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, 29 no. 5
(1991); Kwoka, John E. Jr., Power Structure: Ownership, Integration, and Competition in the U.S. Electricity Industry (Dordrecht, Boston: 1996); Roberts, Mark J.,
"Economies of Density and Size in the Production and Delivery of Electric Power,"
Land Economics, 62 no. 4 (1986).
258 Alfred E. Mistr, Jr., Incremental-Cost Pricing: What Efficiency Requires,
Pub. Util. Fort., Jan. 1, 1996, at 33; Samuel S. Oren, Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation, 18 Energy J. 63 (1997), Samuel S. Oren, Passive Transmission Rights Will
Not Do the Job, Electricity J.(June 1997); Gerald B. Ostroski, Embedded-Cost Pricing: What Fairness Demands, Pub. Util. Fort. Jan. 1, 1996, at 32; Bruce W. Radford, Electric Transmission: An Overview, Pub. Util. Fort., Jan. 1, 1996, at 32;
Mark J. Volpe, Let's Not Socialize Transmission Rates, Pub. Util. Fort., Feb. 15,
1997, at 48; Douglas Bohi & Karen Palmer, The Efficiency of Wholesale vs. Retail
Competition in Electricity, Electricity J., Oct. 1996; Steve Cornelli, Will Customer
Choice Always Lower Costs? Electricity J., Oct., 1996.
259
Geographic scope is needed to achieve what network economists call "pool
effects" in network industries. Charles B. Stabell & Oysteing D. Fjeldstad, Configuring Value Chains for Competitive Advantage: On Chains, Shops and Networks,
19 Strategic Mgmt J.,413 (1998); See also Cooper, Residential Consumer Economics (discussing... .or load balancing in the electric utility industry.).
260 Robert L. Earle et al., Lessons from the First Year of Competition in the
California Electricity Market, Electricity J., Oct. 1999 (describing the process in a
context that finds the potential for market power and inefficiency).
261 FERC Staff Report, supra note 256; Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,
supra note 256; E. Kiah, Thoughts on Wild Prices, July 1998; Power Outage Study
Team, Department of Energy, Interim Report of the U.S. Department of Energy's
Power Outage Supply Study Team, (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter Outages].
262 See, e.g., Michael Maloney, et. al, Customer Choice, Consumer Value: An
Analysis of Retail Competition in America's Electric Industry, Citizens for a Sound
Economy (1996); Michael T. Maloney, Robert E. McCormick, Robert D. Sauer &
Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric
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placed in the range of forty percent. Without close scrutiny, these
claims gained considerable prominence. As the debate has unfolded,

however, it has become clear that the initial claims and promises are
likely to far exceed the reality.26 3 It is now clear that early analyses,
which claimed so much benefit for consumers, had little basis in reality because they were primarily theoretical discussions of the benefits
of competition without thorough analysis of the economics of the
electric utility industry. Their projections were based on unrealistic
assumptions about economic and political behavior; and the analogies

they drew between electricity and other industries ignored market
fundamentals and the fate of captive customers.
Once public scrutiny was brought to bear on these unsubstantiated claims, official estimates became much more subdued (see Exhibit IV-1). In the late 1990s the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) estimated short-term price declines in a competitive electric
market in the range of six to thirteen percent, before stranded cost recovery is added back in. EIA did not believe that even a twenty percent reduction was sustainable.2 6 4

utility Industry, Center for Market Process, 1999.
263 Dale Pharris, Who Really Benefits From Retail Competition?, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (Sept. 1996); Matthew I. Kahal, The CSEF
Electric Deregulation Study: Economic Miracle or the Economists' Cold Fusion,
Electric Consumers' Alliance (Dec. 1996); Ronald J. Binz, et. al., Navigating A
Course to Competition: A Consumer Perspective on Electric Restructuring, Competition Policy Institute (1997)
264 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, Electricity
Prices in a Competitive Environment: Marginal Cost Pricing of Generation Services and Financial Status of Electric Utilities 44-61 (1997).The EIA focused on
much smaller net reductions in electricity costs of 10 percent. In the cases considered to be mot likely to occur (all of which exclude the recovery of stranded costs
through prices), electricity prices would be as much as 0. 7 cents lower than the
price projected in [Annual Energy Outlook 1997] AE097 Reference Case nationally in 1998 - a 10 percent reduction based on an average price of 6.9 cents per
kilowatt hour - and by as much as 0.7 cents per kilowatt hour in 2015 - an 11percent reduction based on the average price of 6.3 cents per kilowatt hour (EIA, p.
62).
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Exhibit IV-1: Declining Projects of Efficiency Gains From
Restructuring and Deregulation26
DATE OF CLAIM
1995a/
1998 b
2002ci

PERCENTAGE PRICE
REDUCTION PROJECTED
40+
6 <20
3-5

Not only did these estimates exclude stranded costs, but they
also did not allow for transaction costs, cost shifting, or the exercise
of market power. The EIA also recognized that actual price declines
will vary by region.
The FERC's analysis in 2002 projected a base case efficiency
gain of about 4 percent over almost two years. 266 Once again, trans265 a' See, for example, Maloney, Michael, et al. al, Customer Choice, Con-

sumer Value: An Analysis of Retail Competition in America's Electric Industry
(Citizens for a Sound Economy, 1996); Maloney, Michael T., Robert E. McCormick and Robert D. Sauer, and Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer
Choice: Lessonsfor the Electric utility Industry (Center for Market Process, 1999)
b/Energy Information Administration, Electricity Prices in a Competitive Environment: Marginal Cost Pricing of Generation Services and FinancialStatus of
Electric utilities, A Preliminary Analysis Through 2015, (U.S. Department of Energy, August 1997.Cl ICF Consulting, Economic Assessment of RTO Policy, Prepared for the Federal energy Regulatory Commission, February 26, 2002, Tables ES-1, ES-2.
Casazza, John, A., "Electricity Choice: Pick Your Poison: A. Errant Economics? B.
Lousy Law? C. Market Manipulation? D. All Three?," Public Utilities Fortnightly,
2001 (March 1), identifies efficiency gains in generation of 3 percent. Newbery,
David M. And Michael G. Pollitt, "The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain's
CEBG-Was It Worth It?" The Journal of Industrial Economics, 45:3, 1997,
places pure efficiency gains at the 5% level for the U.K. (Newberry and Pollitt, pp.
297-298).
266

ICF Consulting, Report for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Economic Assessment of RTO Policy, Feb. 26, 2002, at tables ES- 1, ES-2. John A.
Casazza, Electricity Choice: Pick Your Poison: A. Errant Economics? B. Lousy
Law? C. Market Manipulation? D. All Three?, Pub. Util. Fort., Mar. 1, 2001 (identifying efficiency gains in generation of 3 percent). This latter figure is consistent
with the actual experience in the U.K., which began phasing in a competitive retail
electric market in 1990, suggests caution is necessary in the estimation of benefits.
Efficiency gains have not been very large and the exercise of market power is a
constant threat to consumer gains from restructuring, resulting in the gains not being passed through to consumers. See David M. Newberry & Michael G. Pollitt,
The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain's CEBG -- Was It Worth It?, 45 J.
Indus. Econ. 297, 297-98 (1997).
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action costs, market imperfections and market power are not taken
into account. Even these small gains have been challenged as being
too large.267
As the wild claims of benefits were beaten back, a solid body
of evidence came into place to show how pervasive and difficult the
problem of market power is in the electricity market. Market power
is also a persistent problem. Exhibit IV-2 shows the results of a number of analyses of markets. It includes simulations and actual results.
The most extensive problem occurred in California, 268 but virtually
all markets, even those like PJM and the upper Mid-west that are well
endowed with transmission capacity and excess generation, have
been beset by the problem. The estimated impact on prices of the exercise of market power exceeds the estimated efficiency gains by a
substantial margin.

Our preferred case is pro-privatization allowing for the expansion of nuclear
power under the CEBG, ignoring environmental gains (whose cash value is hard to
measure), and discounting at the public sector discount rate of 6%, for which case
the net present value of benefits is L9.6 billion, equivalent to a permanent cost savings of about 0.16p/kWh, compared to an average 1994/95 price of about
2.8p/kWh, or a cost savings of 5% forever...
In any exercise of this kind, a systematic attempt to understand the workings of
the industry raises yet further questions for further analysis and discussion. First,
who benefited from the cost reductions that we found - was it taxpayers and shareholders..., rather than consumers? Our rather tentative answer is yes, given the
large increase in profits and the relatively small decline in real final prices, and we
have attempted to quantify these redistributive impacts, though they are subject to
larger error margins than the simple efficiency gains
267 New Mexico Office of the Attorney General et. al. before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Comments on the RTO Cost Benefit Analysis Report
(May 3, 2002).
268 Eric Hildebrandt, Further Analysis of the Exercise and Cost Impacts of
Market Power in California's Wholesale Energy Markets, Department of Market
Analysis, California Independent System Operator (ISO) (March 2001); Eric
Hildebrandt, Impacts of Market Power in California's Wholesale Energy Market:
More Detailed Analysis Based on Individual Seller Schedules and Transactions in
the ISO and PX Markets, Department of Market Analysis, California ISO (Apr.
2001); Anjali Sheffrin, Empirical Evidence of Strategic Bidding in California ISO
Real Time Market, Department of Market Analysis, California ISO (Mar. 21,
2001).
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Exhibit IV-2: Market Power Indicator Characteristics
CONCENTRATION ESTIMATED

MARK-UP
Lerner
Index

Model

Year

2813

Leading
Firm
Share
38

52

2002

Wisconsin
Pennsylvania
PJM
U.K.
Florida

2761
2000
1150
1962
1940

47
20
16
31
38

300+
9 - 19
29
21
80

California

1537

10

1000+

Dominant
Firm
Cournot
Coumot
Actual
Actual
Dominant
Firm
Cartel

22-29

Cournot

30

Actual

4 - 11

Actual
(Market
Power
Constrained)

Location

HHI

Colorado

New England

2000
1995
1994
1997
1998

2000

SOURCE: Market shares of Generation = Energy Information Administration, State Electricity Profiles (U.S. Department of Energy,
March 1999); Import capacity for HHI calculation = Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), Electric Power Trends: 2001
(2000); High Tension: The Future of Power Transmission in North
America (August 2000) (hereafter, CERA, High Tension); U.S. Census Bureau, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 2000 (U.S. Department of Commerce), Population growth =Table 20, Cooling degree days and urban population = Table 39, 414: HHI and markups =
Wisconsin = Bushnell, James, Christopher Knittel and Frank Wolak,
Estimating the Opportunitiesfor Market Power in Deregulated Wisconsin Electricity Market (Consumers First, ND); Colorado = Sweetser, Al, An EmpiricalAnalysis of a Dominant Firm's Market Power
in a Restructured Electricity Market: A Case Study of Colorado
(April 1, 1998); Pennsylvania = Rudkevich, Alesandr, Max
Duckworth, and Richard Rosen, "Modeling Electricity Pricing in a
Deregulated Generation Industry: The Potential for Oligopoly Pricing
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in a Poolco," The Energy Journal, 1998 (19); PJM = .Mansur, Erin,
T., PricingBehavior in the Initial Summer of the Restructured PJM
Wholesale Electricity Market (University of California Energy Institute, Program on Workable Energy Regulation, April 2001; UK =
Wolak, Frank A. and Robert H. Patrick, Impact of Market Rules and
Market Structure on the Price DeterminationProcess in the England
and Wales Electricity Market (POWER, February 1997), Wolfram,
Catherine, "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Spot Market,"
American Economic Review, 89: 1999, p. 812, California =
);.Hildebrandt, Eric, Impacts of Market Power in California'sWholesale Energy Market: More Detailed Analysis Based on Individual
Seller Schedules and Transactions in the ISO and PX Markets (Department of Market Analysis, California Independent System Operator, April 9, 2001), Klein, Michael and Loretta Lynch, California's
Electricity Options and Challenges (August, 2000).
For the first year of the reliance on the spot market in California, the exercise of market power has been estimated to have increased costs by 22 to 30 percent, driving prices up by $400 million
to $600 million.269 From 1998 to the summer of 2000, well over a billion dollars in rent was collected in California. 270 In California in
2000, excessive rents were in the range of 40 to 50 percent. 27 ' The
CAL-ISO analysis shows that by February 2001, the costs of a new
plant brought on line in California when the restructured market
commenced in May 199g would have been fully recovered in just
three years.272

The abuse of market power and the impact of tight markets
that was so much in evidence in California are not limited to that
market. PJM, the poster child for deregulation, has suffered similarly
near-vertical supply and the exercise of market power that parallels
269

Borenstein, et. al, supra note 219, at 32-33 (2000)..

270

Cooper, Recognizing, supra note 208, at 430..

271

Bornstein, Bushnell and Wolak, supranote 219.

272

Combining the results of Hildebrandt, Further Analysis, supra note 267, at

tables 3-1, B-1 and B-2, we calculate annual recovery of capital costs under actual
prices in effect in California in 1999-2001 as follows:
ANNUALS RETURN ON INVESTMENT
NP15

SP15

Low Cost plant ($500/MWh@ 14%ROI)

46

32

High cost plant ($600/MWH@ 16%ROI)

39

26
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the problem in California in its early days. 27 3 In the PJM pool, the
markup in the first year was estimated at 29 percent, increasing prices
by $400 to $600 million.2 7 4 In one week in 1998 in the Midwest,
$500 million changed hands; 2 75 $70 million was collected in New
York in one day. 276 The New England power pool experienced price
run-ups. 2 77 In the United Kingdom, the markup of price over cost has
been sustained at the 25 percent level over a long period of time.2 7 8

D. Recognizing Reality
There is simply no credible, real world evidence that the leap
to markets in electricity services is good for consumers, even where
circumstances are ideal. The problems of restructuring became so
273 Joseph Bowring, et al., Presentation at the UCEI Power Conference: Monitoring the PJM Market: Summer 1999 (Mar. 17, 2000); Rose, Other States, supra
note 256; Steven Stoft, PJM's Capacity Market in a Price-Spike World, University
of California Energy Institute, Program on Workable Energy Regulation, Working
Paper PWP-077 (2000); Alexander Rudkevich, Max Duckworth, and Richard
Rosen, "Modeling Electricity Pricing in a Deregulated Generation Industry: The
Potential for Oligopoly Pricing in a Poolco," The Energy Journal, 1998 (19).
274 Erin T. Mansur, Pricing Behavior in the Initial Summer of the Restructured
PJM Wholesale Electricity Market, University of California Energy Institute, Program on Workable Energy Regulation, Working Paper PWP-083 (2001).
275 Cooper, Spike, supra note 228; Robert L. Earle, et al., supra note Lessons
from the First Year of Competition in the California Electricity Market, Electricity
J. (1999).
276 Rosen, et al., supra note 241.
277 Dowden, McDiarmid and Huang, supra note 221 ; Daniel Allen et. al.,
Generator Outage Increases: A Preliminary Analysis of Outage Trends in the New
England Electricity Market, prepared for the Union of Concerned Scientists (Jan. 7,
2001); Rosen, et al., supra note 241.
278 Catherine D. Wolfram, Elecqicity Markets: Should the Rest of the World
Adopt the United Kingdom's Reforms?, Regulation, Winter 1999, at 5, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs.regulation/regv22n4/reg22n4.html [hereinafter Reform]
From 1992 to 1994, on average prices were 25 percent above the cost of the
last plant needed to generate electricity in a given period. That suggests prices
would have been substantially lower had they been set competitively. Since 1994,
fuel prices have come down but electricity prices have not fallen accordingly. That
suggests profits have risen and provides further evidence that prices are not responding to competitive forces.
Frank A. Wolak & Robert H. Patrick, Impact of Market Rules and Market
Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity
Market, University of California Energy Institute, Program on Workable Energy
Regulation, Working Paper PWP-047 (1997).
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evident, that even the staunchly conservative and free marketoriented Cato Institute threw in the towel. In a paper entitled Re2 79
thinking
Restructuring.
a questionElectricity
of empirical
economics. Cato has discovered that this is
In regulated markets, it is usually quite easy for economists
to demonstrate that consumers do not benefit from regulation, but unlike many other markets, electricity markets
have characteristics that are difficult to manage through
property rights and contracts. Accordingly, regulation has
at least the possibility of a plausible rationale.28
Cato has discovered that the grid is a public good. In economic jargon, it provides the stage for a comedy of the commons. For
example, the alternating current (AC) grid is a "commons."
Power added by any generator on an AC transmission system follows all paths but favors those with least resistance
rather than the shortest distance between generator and customer. Thus, bilateral contracts between any willing seller
and buyer of electricity affect all other buyers and sellers
within each interconnected system in ways that are not captured by prices-the textbook definition of externality.
Moreover, transmission additions confer benefits across all
generators and consumers on the grid and thus have public
good characteristics. The development of property rights
and prices
that internalize those characteristics is very diffi28 1
cult.

Demand elasticity is extremely low.
Market forces, it was hoped, would introduce marginal-cost
pricing and as a result reduce peak demand, increase offpeak demand, and reduce the needless political fighting
(most notably, the eternal fight over more supply versus
less demand) that inevitably arises in electricity markets
because of the absence of prices as a signaling device.

279

Jerry Taylor & Peter Van Doren, Rethinking Electricity Restructuring. Pol-

icy Analysis, Nov. 30, 2004.
280 Id. at 6.
281

Id.
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Prices in San Diego were free of all control from July 1999
though August 2000: a doubling of prices resulted in a demand reduction of 2.3 percent, an extremely disappointing
response.
Even though demand does respond to price, many observers have concluded that demand responsiveness is too low,
and, therefore, price spikes would be too high for too long
in a truly deregulated environment with tight supplies.2 8 2
Cato has discovered the problem that utility assets create because of their long-term fixed nature. The problem that results is one
that frequently afflicts common pool resources, a tragedy of the anticommons:
[I]n an unregulated world, the relations between electric
firms and consumers would likely be governed by long
term contracts because the dedicated nature of electricity
assets implies that each side can "hold up" the other.
In short, the weakness of the private solution is the inability
to capture the full benefits of their investof investors
283
ment.
Administrative challenges strain the grid:
Although the blackout was not caused by market forces, it is
likely that the increased loads and flows across a transmission grid
that has experienced little new investment is causing greater stress
and human beings that are critical comupon the hardware, software,
284
system.
the
of
ponents
Supply-side scarcity rents are extreme in this industry:
In unregulated electricity markets, then, marginal sources of
electricity - such as high cost generators typically in operation only
during the peak-demand periods - would need to earn at least a normal return. That implies that those facilities with lower marginal
of
costs whose supply is limited... would receive payments in excess
2 85
marginal cost (and a normal return) in an unregulated market.
If we are correct, this implies that gains to trade not occurring
282 Id.
283

Id. at 7.

284

Id. at4.

285

Id. at 5.
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under the current balkanized system are much smaller than many observers believe. Accordingly, the fight between the old regime and a
restructured regime (that is, the case for a transmission-intense versus
286
balkanized system) is a fight about wealth rather than efficiency.
The authors also discover political economy.
This is why low-cost states vigorously resist a national integrated electricity market - it would allow their electricity to go to the
highest bidder rather than to those who happen to reside within an
electric utility's current service territory. State decision makers understandably resist using ratepayer dollars to7Pay
for investments that
28
will primarily help parties outside the state.

CONCLUSION
Electricity may be the most extreme case of the energy sectors, but there are substantial similarities between them all. All of the
long distance transport pipelines in the United States are either monopolies or close to it, as is the distribution of natural gas. The premium on integration and coordination is high in all three sectors. Assets are capital intensive, long lived and sunk. The existence of large
scarcity rents and the high levels of concentration are evident across
all of these markets, as is the low elasticity of supply and demand.
The commodities are expensive to store and excess capacity is extremely short where it is not required by regulators. Federal authorities have failed to properly take these factors into account in their
oversight of these industries, and American energy consumers have
suffered mightily as a result.
The severe problems in these energy markets have given rise
to numerous congressional hearing and investigations. The FTC and
the CFTC have defended their actions and resisted greater oversight.288 The FERC, presented with the obvious disaster in Western
electricity markets, dragged its feet, tried to downplay the extent of
the problem and issued new rules to push electricity deregulation
forward, an effort that was stopped by the Congress.
When the
FERC was granted greater authority over commodity trading, it simply adopted the case law and approach of the CFTC,290thereby gutting
the Congressional effort to impose greater oversight.
286 Taylor, supra note 278,
287

at 6

Id. at 4.

288 Supra, notes

198, 199.

289

PL 109-58, Title XII-Subtitle c.

290

Supra, note 206.
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Detailed policy alternatives have been offered in each of these
sectors, but in keeping with the broad cross-sector approach of this
paper, the central policy conclusion that should be drawn is that weak
market forces in the energy sector require policymakers to change
their mind set about energy markets. The general approach in the
U.S. in the past quarter century was to assume that markets work and
restrict the extent of regulation and oversight of them. In energy
markets we need to flip the presumptions around. We need to assume that market failure and market power will be a prominent and
permanent feature of the markets and implement policies to prevent
abuse. In oil and natural gas, this means lowering the threshold for
merger review and escalating the oversight of abusive behaviors. In
electricity, this means carefully assessing where competition might
work and making sure that competition exists before markets are deregulated.
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America, please visit: www.consumerfed.org.
"CFA is an advocacy, research, education, and service organization. As an advocacy group, it works to advance proconsumer policy on a variety of issues before Congress, the
White House, federal and state regulatory agencies, state
legislatures, and the courts. Its staff works with public officials to promote beneficial policies, to oppose harmful
policies, and to ensure a balanced debate on important issues in which consumers have a stake.
As a research organization, CFA investigates consumer issues, behavior, and attitudes using surveys, polling, focus
groups, and literatures reviews. The findings of such projects are published in reports that assist consumer advocates
and policymakers as well as individual consumers. This research also provides the basis for new consumer initiatives,
public service advertising, and consumer information and
education efforts.
As an education organization, CFA disseminates information on consumer issues to the public and the media, as well
as to policymakers and other public interest advocates.
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newsletter, and a website all contribute to CFA's education
program.
Finally, as a service organization, CFA provides support to
national, state, and local organizations committed to the
goals of consumer advocacy, research, and education.
Some of these organizations are consumer advocacy, education, or cooperative organizations that belong to the fed'
eration."291
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